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Sponsored search advertising has emerged as an important and significant forum for 
advertisers, accounting for 40% of all advertising spending online.  The unique features 
of sponsored search advertising – the nature of consumer search as well as the pricing 
mechanisms employed – differentiate it from traditional advertising formats, and raise 
many interesting questions regarding consumers’ search and purchase behavior, sellers’ 
advertising strategies, and the ensuing market dynamics.  However, despite the robust 
growth in sponsored search advertising, research on its implications is limited.  My 
dissertation, comprising three essays, seeks to fill this gap.  In addition to examining the 
effects of sponsored search advertising on consumers and sellers, I also investigate the 
validity of theories developed for traditional media in an emerging online sponsored 
search context.  
The first essay focuses on the impact of a seller’s sponsored search advertising 
strategies, including its rank in the sponsored listing, the unique selling proposition (USP) 
  
employed in its advertisement text/creative, and competitive market dynamics on the 
performance of the focal seller’s advertisement.  Drawing upon prior research on 
consumer search and directional markets, I propose a model of the consumer search 
process in the sponsored search context and conduct an empirical study to test the 
research model.  The results validate the research hypothesis that the search listing can 
act as a consumer filtering mechanism and competitiv  intensity within adjacent ranks 
has a significant impact on the seller’s performance.   
The second essay employs consumer search and quality signaling theories from 
information systems, marketing, and economics to understand the impact of the 
informational cues contained in the sponsored search listing about sellers’ relative 
advertising expenditure on consumer search and purchase behavior.  Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, I find that the unique format of he sponsored search listing 
significantly increases the strength of the advertising signal vis-à-vis the price signal.  In 
addition, I find that the risk attitude of consumers has a significant impact on the valence 
of these different information cues in the online setting.   
The third essay examines market outcomes in directional markets such as sponsored 
search and comparison shopping advertising.  Specifically, I focus on comparison 
shopping advertising where advertising not only informs consumers about price and 
quality but also directs consumer search.  I find that he relationship between a firm’s 
price, quality, and advertising intensity in this market is strikingly different from that in 
traditional markets, a result attributable to the differential impact of price and quality on 
an advertiser’s conversion rates and profit margins.   
  
Overall, these studies provide crucial insights into consumer behavior in online 
sponsored search markets.  These findings have significant implications for firms, as well 
as for the market makers.  Insights from these studies will enable practitioners to develop 
appropriate advertising strategies and online intermediaries to optimize the design of 
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW  
 
The rapid growth of Internet and the emergence of advanced information and 
communication technologies have created an environment conducive for disruptive 
innovations.  Today’s Internet economy, fueled by such innovations, has witnessed 
transformation of existing business models and the em rgence of new business models.  
Online advertising is one such innovation which is dramatically changing the dynamics 
of advertising industry and has the potential to have  profound impact on businesses, 
industries, as well as consumers.  Therefore, it is not surprising that researchers and 
practitioners have focused their attention on understanding this online advertising 
phenomenon.  My dissertation, comprising of three essays, examines the effect of online 
sponsored search advertising on consumers’ search and sellers’ advertising strategies.  In 
the following paragraphs I provide a brief overview of the trends in online advertising.  I 
then describe the mechanics of online sponsored search advertising.  Finally, I provide an 
outline of the three essays.   
 
1.1 ONLINE ADVERTISING: GROWTH AND TRENDS  
According to recent reports Internet advertising revenues (U.S.) for the first six 
months of 2005 were approximately $5.8 billion, a 26% increase over the first half of 
2004 (Interactive Advertising Bureau 2005).  Neverth less, the share of online 
advertising in the total advertising budget is still miniscule compared to traditional 
advertising.  According to a recent study by (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2005), Internet 
advertising revenues accounted for only 3.7 percent (approximately) of total U.S. 
advertisement spending in 2004.  However, as the reach of Internet grows, and as more 
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consumers use the Internet to gather information and purchase products, the share of 
online advertising in the traditional media mix is bound to increase correspondingly.  In 
the words of Tom Hyland, Chair PricewaterhouseCoopers New Media Group, "History 
shows that advertising ultimately follows the audienc , and with 66% of all Americans 
having regular access to the Internet, we believe ad rtising budgets will continue to shift 
more online as long as the online medium continues to gain share of overall media 
consumption" (Interactive Advertising Bureau 2003).   
The disruptive nature of online advertising business model and associated 
information technologies is evident from the emergence of companies like Google and 
other intermediaries like Overture (which was acquired by Yahoo), ValueClick and 
LinkShare which provide infrastructure for online advertising.  Online advertising has 
also spawned new support businesses (for example, Efficient Frontier, Advertising.com, 
iProspect, etc.,) which help advertisers to optimize their online advertising expenditure, 
conduct demographic as well as behavioral targeting campaigns and deliver customized 
advertisements to target audience.  In addition to the emergence of new advertising 
intermediaries, online media has also lowered barriers of entry for publishers and 
advertisers, thus, enabling emergence of small and niche content publishers such as 
bloggers and enabling firms will small advertisement budgets to compete with large 
national players.  Clearly this emerging advertising format has significant implications 
for businesses, consumers, and policy makers and opens up interesting research issues for 
academicians and practitioners alike. 
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1.2 ONLINE SPONSORED SEARCH ADVERTISING 
Online advertising can be defined as delivery of digital advertisements (which 
may include audio, video, image and text) to Internet users.  Online advertising can be 
classified into various categories based on the message format, interactivity, 
intrusiveness, etc.  According to one of the industry classification, online advertising can 
be of following types: display advertising, search advertising, sponsorship, referral, 
email, rich media, slotting, email and classifieds  (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2005).  
Appendix A provides definitions of these formats.   
Advertising has been generally considered to have two roles – persuasive 
(changes consumers’ taste and brand loyalty) and informative (informs consumers about 
price and/or quality).  We define sponsored search dvertising broadly as online 
directional market where advertising not only informs consumers about existence of the 
firms’ product/service offerings and related information but also directs consumer search 
pattern/sequence.  We identify two different market makers who provide sponsored 
search advertising – search engines and comparison shopping engines.  As explained 
below, the sponsored advertisement markets created by these online intermediaries are 
similar in terms of pricing and the ordering of thesellers in an ordered list but differ 
primarily in terms of the kind of information availble to the consumer.  We will refer to 
the sponsored advertising markets created by search ngines as ponsored search 
advertising and the sponsored advertising market created by comparison shopping 
engines as comparison shopping advertising.   
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The following paragraphs describe the sponsored advertising formats and pricing 
mechanism, and provide a comparison of sponsored advertising format with traditional 
advertising.   
 
1.2.1 Sponsored Search Advertisement 
Sponsored search advertisements (also known as “paid se rch advertising” or 
“pay-for-placement” or “keyword advertising”) are tx -based advertisement messages 
displayed alongside the “organic” (i.e. algorithm based) search results, in response to a 
user’s search query.   
A typical sponsored search advertisement contains a title line and two lines of 
description followed by the website address (i.e., URL) of the advertiser.  Each line has 
between 25 and 45 characters.  This text, also referred to as the “creative” plays an 
important role as it conveys information about the firm and its offerings to potential 
consumers (see Figure 1.1 for examples of ad creatives used by different advertisers 
selling digital cameras).  Advertisers select the keywords that are relevant to their product 
or service and bid on them for enhanced placement (i. ., higher rank) of their 
advertisements in the sponsored search results.  The hig er the bid, the higher the 
advertiser’s message appears in the sponsored search list, which should lead to more 
sales-leads (clickthroughs), and consequently greate  s les.   
The sponsored search model employs an auction mechanism for pricing the 
placement/position of an advertisement in the sponsored search listing for each keyword.  
Advertisers bid on keywords relevant to their product or service, for enhanced placement 
(i.e., higher rank) of their advertisements in sponsored search results.  The higher the bid, 
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the higher the advertiser’s message appears in the sponsored search list, which should 
lead to more sales-leads (click-throughs), and consequently greater sales.   
Major search engines like Google and Yahoo conduct a ions to price the 
advertisements on various slots in their sponsored listings.  Each sponsored listing 
corresponds to a specific keyword and can be considered as a separate auction market.  
An advertiser’s bid in an auction represents the amount an advertiser is willing to pay for 
every click on its advertisement.  The rank of an advertiser’s advertisement in a specific 
keyword search listing is determined by the advertis ’s rank in the auction for that 
keyword.  An advertiser pays only for the click-throughs (i.e. when a user clicks on an 
advertisement link and visits the advertiser’s websit ) and is not charged for the 
exposures.  The payment per click, however, is not based on advertiser’s own bid but is 
equal to the bid of the next highest bidder. 
Different sponsored search markets such as Yahoo! and Google, employ variants 
of the basic auction mechanism.  Yahoo allocates ranks on the listing to advertisers based 
purely on their bids for clickthroughs.  However, it uses a “click index” -- a scoring 
system to determine how an advertiser’s listing is performing relative to a competitor’s 
listing -- to filter low performing advertisements.  It removes the listings with low click 
index scores.  Google, on the other hand, has incorporated this feature in its auction 
mechanism itself.  Google uses a sophisticated proprietary algorithm which takes into 
account the bid and historical click-throughs of the advertisers to determine their rank in 
the sponsored list.  Thus, in effect, Google provides iscount to the advertisers whose 
advertisements generate more click-throughs than other advertisers.  Apart from the 
advertisement allocation mechanism, there are other diff ences in the auction 
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mechanisms employed by these intermediaries.  Yahoo uctions are transparent as any 
bidder can see his bid and determine his position on the relevant search result pages 
whereas Google does not make the bids publicly available.  Further, the minimal bid 
amount and bid increment may also vary across these intermediaries.   
An interesting point to note is that these auctions are held in infinite time horizon 
and are dynamic.  The auctions are dynamic as an advertiser cannot lock a rank for a 
keyword term.  Since advertisers’ can change their bids at any time, the rank/position of 
the advertisements on the listing may change dynamically depending on the rank ordering 
of the current bids.  Thus it becomes difficult forthe advertisers’ to monitor and manage 
the bidding process.  To make it easier for advertis rs to bid for a specific position, 
auctioneers and third parties provide automated biding tools to adjust bids in order to 
maintain a rank in the listing, subject to an advertis ’s maximum bid constraint. 
 
1.2.2 Comparison Shopping Advertising 
Recently comparison shopping engines have gained prominence as an online consumer 
acquisition channel and are growing rapidly.  According to Hitwise, a market research 
firm, 5.3% of traffic to online retailers was driven by comparison-shopping sites in 
December 2005, which is a 26% increase from December 2004.  The future growth 
potential of comparison engines can be gauged by the recent acquisition of the major 
comparison engines.  For example, PriceGrabber.com was bought by Experian for $485 
million, Shopping.com was bought by ebay for $620 million, and Shopzilla (formerly 
Bizrate.com) was bought by E. W. Scripps for $525 million (Rand 2005).   
The comparison shopping advertisements display a list of advertisers selling a 
particular product to a potential consumer who is searching for that product on the 
7 
shopping engine.  Unlike sponsored search advertisements, the comparison shopping 
advertisements include price and quality (i.e., the customer satisfaction ratings) of the 
advertisers/firms in the market along with other relevant information.  This is the main 
difference between the sponsored search advertising and comparison shopping 
advertising.  Another difference is that the sponsored search advertisements are displayed 
next to organic search result.  However, the comparison shopping advertisements are 
solely for sellers and therefore do not include organic search results.   
Comparison shopping engine conducts online auctions similar to sponsored 
search auctions conducted by search engines like Google and Yahoo! and allots top 3 
ranks on the shopping list to the firms who emerge as the top 3 bidders in an auction 
conducted by the engine.  Firms pay a fee known as cost-per-click (CPC) for every 
consumer who clicks on their advertisement and thusvisits their online store.  Firms 
willing to pay more (i.e., having higher advertising i tensity) for every potential customer 
visit to their website gets higher rank in the listing.  Other firms in the market have lower 
advertising intensity than these top 3 firms and are ordered in the listing based on the 
price of their product.  We focus on comparison shopping market in the third essay. 
 
1.2.3 Comparison with Traditional Advertising Media 
One of the interesting aspects of sponsored search advertising is the integration 
and co-evolution of online search and advertising business models.  Given that search 
engines have become the starting point for Internet navigation, it is not surprising that 
advertisers have been trying to garner the attention of online consumers through 
advertisements on the search engine result pages.  A study shows that 88% of adults who 
purchase items online conduct some sort of online res arch at least sometimes prior to 
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completing their purchase and 67% of those who resea ch online before making a 
purchase decision use search engines as a research tool (iCrossing 2005).  This trend has 
led to the emergence of sponsored search and comparison shopping advertising, thus 
transforming search engines into a very influential and lucrative advertising media.   
Sponsored search advertising and comparison shopping advertising differs from 
traditional (media) advertising in a number of significant ways.  The closest analogue to 
sponsored search advertising medium in traditional media is the yellow pages directory 
which is also a pull media (i.e. consumer pulls the information rather than advertiser 
pushing the advertisement).  However, the capabilities of digital media provide an 
unprecedented platform to create an ordered/ranked listing of sellers to be shown to the 
consumer searching for a product, and to operate an auction mechanism to allocate ranks 
on the listing to the sellers.  This auction based ranking mechanism results in more 
intense competition among advertisers to reach out to potential consumers than 
traditional yellow pages.  The relative ranking of advertisers, not practical in the 
traditional yellow pages directory, also has the potential to significantly influence 
consumer behavior by informing consumers about the relative advertising intensity of 
advertisers.   
The advertisement presentation format also affects the order in which consumers 
visit the advertisements appearing in a listing.  In the case of yellow pages directory, the 
order in which a consumer browses the advertisements may differ significantly across 
consumers due to a large variety of dimensions on which the advertisements vary.  The 
various dimensions are text versus visual ad, large versus small ad, colored versus black 
and white, bold versus plain listing, and amount and type of information presented in the 
9 
advertisement (Lohse 1997).  The importance that a consumer attaches to each of these 
numerous combinations while deciding the order in which to browse the advertisements 
may be difficult to determine and predict.  On the other hand, the advertisements on the 
sponsored search listing differ primarily in terms of their rank in the listing.  Though the 
text of the advertisement also varies but due to space constraints there is not much 
difference in terms of type and amount of information presented.  Thus, the ordered 
presentation format limits the freedom/flexibility that a consumer may have in browsing 
the advertisements.  Consequently, a consumer consciously or subconsciously browses 
the listing from top to the bottom (Hoque and Lohse 1999; Sherman 2005; DoubleClick 
2006).  Further, in related search contexts, research rs have found that the ordinal ranking 
of the firms is strongly related to a consumer’s likelihood of visiting a firm and 
purchasing from it (Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001; Ellison and Ellison 2004).  This pattern 
of search where consumers find it natural to search from top to bottom of the listing 
creates a directional market where it is “costlier” for a typical consumer to visit sellers at 
the bottom of the list before visiting the sellers at the top of the listing.   
 This directional nature of the market also affects the distribution of consumers 
that each firm encounters.  Economists examining the traditional media generally assume 
that consumers sample the firms randomly while searching a media such as yellow pages 
(Perry and Wigderson 1986).  However, sponsored search media creates an environment 
where the order in which the firms are searched is known (i.e. is a function of the rank of 
the firm on the listing).  Consequently , strategies employed by the firms and the resulting 
competition dynamics in such an ordered media may be different that those in the 
traditional media (Perry and Wigderson 1986; Arbatsk ya forthcoming).    
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1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY  
Despite the phenomenal growth in sponsored search advertising, existing research 
on the implications of this new form of advertising is limited.  The advent of sponsored 
search advertising raises many interesting questions regarding consumers’ search and 
purchase behavior, sellers’ advertising strategies, and the ensuing market dynamics.  
Current research in this field focuses primarily on designing better rank/position 
allocation mechanisms (Feng, Bhargava et al. forthcming), identifying optimal bidding 
strategies (Kitts and Leblanc 2004), or examining market dynamics (Animesh, 
Ramachandran et al. 2006; Edelman and Ostrovsky forthcoming).  Very little is known 
about consumer search behavior in this context, or the implications of sponsored search 
mechanisms for seller strategies.  My dissertation, c mprising three essays, seeks to fill 
this gap by examining the effects of sponsored search dvertising on consumers and 
sellers.   
The first essay seeks to examine the impact of the interaction between a seller’s 
sponsored search advertising strategies and consumer search behavior on advertisement’s 
performance.  I employ consumer search theory to ident fy the factors that affect 
performance of a seller’s advertising strategies.  The second essay employs consumer 
search and quality signaling theories from marketing a d economics to understand the 
impact of the availability of informational cues about sellers’ relative advertising 
expenditure on consumer search and purchase behavior.  The third essay investigates the 
outcomes in comparison shopping engines which are also directional markets similar to 
sponsored search advertising.  Specifically, I examine the affect of the price and quality 
11 
of a firm’s product/service on its advertising intesity in comparison shopping 
advertising market.    
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows.  Chapter Two, Three, and Four 
present the three primary research studies that constitute my dissertation.  Chapter Five 
describes the implications of the findings from theree research studies and concludes 
with suggestions for future research.   
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CHAPTER 2:  COMPETING “CREATIVELY” IN ONLINE MARKET S: 




 While the efficiency-enhancing features of online markets have been well studied much 
less is known about firms’ differentiation strategies n such competitive markets, or the 
outcomes of such differentiation.  This study examines competition among firms in 
online sponsored search markets - one of the fastest growing and most competitive of 
online markets.  Given the nascence of online sponsored search and the lack of 
sophisticated differentiation strategies, firms have primarily sought to be listed on top of 
the search results, leading to intense competition.  With the rapid evolution of sponsored 
search markets from simple auctions to sophisticated forums for customer acquisition, the 
need to go beyond a myopic focus of competing for the top slots and seek effective 
differentiation strategies is becoming clear.  In this chapter I develop and test a model 
that predicts the clickthrough rate (CTR) of a seller’s listing in a sponsored search setting.  
Drawing upon consumer search theory and competitive positioning strategies I theorize 
that the CTR is jointly driven by the seller’s positioning strategy as reflected by the 
unique selling proposition (USP) highlighted in its “ad-creative,” by its rank in the 
sponsored search listing, and the nature of competition around the focal seller’s listing.  I 
use data from a field experiment conducted by leading firm in the mortgage industry 
where the firm varied its rank and USP dynamically.  Results suggest that sponsored 
search listings can act as an effective customer segmentation mechanism, consistent with 
a model of consumer search in directional markets.  I further find that the relationship 
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between the firm’s positioning strategy and its rank in the listing is strongly moderated by 
its ability to differentiate itself from adjacent rivals.  I discuss the implications of the 
findings for sellers’ strategies in sponsored search markets and for extending 




Online marketplaces have significantly transformed the essence of commerce, 
influencing the way buyers and sellers interact and transact in many industries.  Among 
the most widely studied aspects of online marketplaces is their role in lowering buyers’ 
search costs and the resulting impact on market efficiency (e.g., Alba, Lynch et al. 1997; 
Bakos 1997; Bailey, Yao et al. 1999; Smith 2001; Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001; Bakos, 
Lucas et al. 2005).  However, while it is true that lower search costs for consumers have 
led to increased price competition in online markets, it is also well known the firms in 
competitive settings successfully differentiate thems lves from their rivals to reduce price 
pressures.  Such positioning and differentiation strategies have been extensively studied 
in traditional settings (Economides 1986; Deephouse 1999; Netz and Taylor 2002) but 
suprisingly,  very few studies (for exceptions, seeLynch and Ariely 2000; Brynjolfsson, 
Dick et al. 2004; Kuksov 2004; Bakos, Lucas et al. 2005) have examined the 
differentiation strategies adopted by sellers to counteract the increased competition in 
online markets, or the effectiveness of such differentiation.  This essay examines the 
outcomes of differentiation on price and quality attributes by a focal firm competing for 
customers, in one of the fastest growing and the most c mpetitive online markets – 
sponsored search advertising.  
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In online sponsored search (also known as “paid search” or “pay-for-placement” or 
“keyword”) markets, firms compete to be listed on tp of search results generated in 
response to a user’s query (keyword search) in search engines such as Google and 
Yahoo!.  Sponsored search markets have evolved to bec me the dominant mechanism for 
customer acquisition online, with firms reallocating significant proportions of their 
advertising budgets from traditional media to online sponsored search.  In 2005, for 
instance, sponsored search accounted for more than 40% of the total online advertising 
dollars spent by companies in the United States (Markoff and Ives 2005).  These markets 
exhibit a number of unique characteristics that make them ideal test-beds for 
understanding the effectiveness of online differentiation strategies.  As noted earlier, they 
are highly competitive; the intensity of competition being reflected in the staggering costs 
for the top slots for several product-keywords.  Firms are willing to incur theses costs 
because the market allows them to precisely target consumers that are actively searching 
for specific products or services.  In addition, online sponsored search markets use a pay-
per-click pricing mechanism in contrast to most traditional advertising formats that adopt 
a lump-sum pay-per-exposure pricing mechanism.  This paves the way for numerous 
smaller, less-established, firms to compete with their larger, well-established 
counterparts, diminishing the role of brand name as the key differentiating factor, and 
further intensifying competition for the top slots.  Finally, and most significantly, the 
ordered listing of advertisers in sponsored search markets creates an information 
environment such that consumers tend to browse throug  the listings sequentially in the 
order they are listed1.  This “sequential search” creates a directional mrket2, where firms 
                                               
1 This is in contrast to traditional markets or media such as the yellow pages, where consumers have been 
shown to sample firms randomly (Perry and Wigderson 1986). 
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listed on the top have an advantage over firms appearing lower in the listing (Arbatskaya 
forthcoming).  The directional nature of online spons red search markets and the 
resulting sequential nature of consumer search, further intensifies competition for the top 
ranks, and the associated cost to firms of using these markets.  
Given the nature of this heightened online competition, it becomes imperative for 
firms to successfully differentiate themselves in such settings.  While firms competing in 
traditional contexts rely on factors such as physical location, the lack of geographical 
constraints requires firms to seek additional avenues for differentiation in online markets.  
However, very little is known about the effectiveness of differentiation strategies adopted 
by firms in these online markets.  To the extent tha sponsored search markets constitute a 
significant forum for customer acquisition, and to the degree that the strategic 
significance of these markets is likely to grow, it is clearly important to gain a more 
complete understanding of competition in such online contexts.  
To date, extant research on sponsored search has focu ed primarily on designing 
optimal rank allocation mechanisms or on developing bidding strategies for sellers to 
obtain higher ranks in the search listing.  Much of the research in this area builds upon 
earlier work on the design of auctions and optimal bidding strategies for firms (Kitts and 
Leblanc 2004; Feng, Bhargava et al. forthcoming), and l rgely treats sellers as 
homogenous bidders.  This body of research ignores the trategic choices made by other 
sellers that is likely to be not only restrictive, but also misleading.  Further, in addition to 
limited understanding about the characteristics of bidders, little is known about consumer 
                                                                                                                                 
2 In the context of sponsored search markets, the directionality arises from the cognitive costs to a consumer of 
visiting sellers at the bottom of the list before visiting those at the top of the listing. 
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search behavior in the sponsored search context, and the implications of this behavior for 
seller strategies.  
The focus of this study is on the unanswered question  regarding sellers’ positioning 
strategies, consumers’ search behavior, and the ensuing market dynamics in sponsored 
search settings.  Drawing on the consumer search, directional markets, and competitive 
positioning literatures, I identify factors that influence the performance (as measured by 
clickthrough rates) of a focal firm’s advertisement over and above the effect its rank in 
the listing.  I use data from a field experiment to examine how a seller’s positioning 
strategy (i.e. its Unique Selling Proposition (USP)) as highlighted in its “ad-creative” 
influences the effectiveness of its listing in the sponsored search market.  I also examine 
the performance effects of the interaction between th  firm’s positioning strategy and its 
rank in the sponsored search listing.  Consistent with a model of consumer search in 
directional markets, the results suggest that sponsored search listings can act as an 
effective customer segmentation mechanism.  I further investigate the influence of 
competition on the performance of the focal seller’s advertisement, and find that the 
relationship between the seller’s positioning strategy and its rank in the listing is strongly 
moderated by its ability to differentiate itself from its rivals.  Overall, the findings yield 
important implications for sellers’ strategies in sponsored search markets as well as for 
extending understanding of consumer search behavior in di ectional markets. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 reviews the sponsored 
search literature and other relevant literature from economics, marketing and information 
systems that has studied consumer search, as well as competitive and positioning 
strategies.  In section 2.3, I present research hypot eses.  The research methodology is 
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described in section 2.4, followed by results in section 2.5.  Section 2.6 provides a 
discussion of the findings and their implications, and Section 2.7 concludes the chapter.   
 
2.2 A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF AD PERFORMANCE 
As described in Chapter 1, major search engines such as Google and Yahoo! conduct 
auctions to price advertisements on various ranks i their sponsored listings.  Since 
sellers can change their bids in real time, their rank on a listing may change dynamically 
depending on the rank ordering of the current bids.  Thus a seller cannot lock-in a rank 
for a keyword and has to constantly monitor and actively manage the bidding process.  
To make it easier for sellers to bid for a specific rank, auctioneers and third parties 
provide automated bidding tools to adjust bids in order to maintain a rank in the listing, 
subject to the seller’s maximum bid constraint. Given the dynamic nature of these 
advertising auctions, sponsored search markets require significant strategizing by sellers.  
Seller strategies need to be shaped not only by the normative implications of auction 
design but also by the expected response of end-consumers to the adopted differentiation 
strategy.  Yet, despite the phenomenal growth of these markets, research providing 
insight into the implications of these relatively new markets for sellers’ strategies is 
limited.  This study seeks to fill this gap by examining the effects of a firm’s positioning 
and differentiation strategies in sponsored search markets on the performance of its 
sponsored search listings.   
The conceptual model guiding this study is shown in Figure 2.1.  The performance of a 
firm’s advertisement in a sponsored search listing is the observable consumer behavior in 
the form of a clickthrough; representing the culminat on of a search process.  The search 
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process, in turn, takes place in a context characterized by the strategic decisions made by 
the seller in regard to ad rank and USP, together with the competitive landscape within 
which the ad is displayed.  Below I briefly review relevant literature that provides the 
theoretical foundation for the proposed conceptualization. 
Sponsored Search Listings and Consumer Search 
Research on sponsored search advertising is still in a nascent stage.  As noted earlier, 
current research in this field predominantly adopts an auctions perspective to examine the 
interaction between the search intermediary who conducts the sponsored search auction 
and sellers who bid in these auctions.  One stream of research focuses on designing better 
rank/position allocation mechanisms from the perspectiv  of the search intermediary 
(Aggarwal, Goel et al. 2006; Asdemir 2006; Lahaie 2006; Edelman, Ostrovsky et al. 
forthcoming; Feng, Bhargava et al. forthcoming; Varian forthcoming), while a second 
identifies optimal bidding strategies from the persctive of sellers (Kitts and Leblanc 
2004; Borgs, Chayes et al. 2006; Rusmevichientong and Williamson 2006).  In addition, 
a few studies examine the market dynamics that result from these sponsored search 
auctions (Animesh, Ramachandran et al. 2006; Edelman and Ostrovsky forthcoming).   
However, limited research has examined consumer search behavior in this context, or 
the implications of sponsored search mechanisms for eller strategies.  In one of the few 
scholarly studies on consumer behavior in sponsored search context, Jansen and Resnick 
(2005) examine the perception of searchers towards sponsored search listings and find 
that compared to organic search listings, consumers ar  keptical of sponsored search 
results and trust them less.  This study adds to this s ream of research by highlighting the 
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importance of understanding consumer search behavior in these markets and its 
implications for the effectiveness of various sponsored search differentiation strategies. 
Research in economics and information systems suggets that a consumer’s search 
cost has a significant impact on the price, product positioning, advertising and other 
strategic decisions of a firm (Stigler 1961; Bakos 1997).  Search costs also determine the 
competitive dynamics and structure of a market (Stahl 1982) as well as consumer welfare 
(Salop and Stiglitz 1977).  Given that the Internet and online marketplaces have radically 
lowered the consumer’s search cost, researchers have employed models of consumer 
search to examine the implications of online markets on various stakeholders (Alba, 
Lynch et al. 1997; Lal and Sarvary 1999; Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001).  Since 
sponsored search advertising also significantly influences consumers’ search costs in 
online markets (Arbatskaya forthcoming), a consumer search perspective provides an 
appropriate framework to study sellers’ strategies in sponsored search markets.   
The Nature of Consumer Search 
Two key aspects of the search process are relevant to the conceptualization: one, how 
much consumers are willing to search (i.e., their search intensity), and two, the nature of 
the search process in terms of the specific information sought. 
Determinants of Search Intensity 
The economics and marketing literature employs a cost-benefit framework to understand 
consumers’ information search and choice behavior (Stigler 1961; Ratchford 1982).  
Researchers suggest that consumers differ in terms of their search intensity, i.e., the time 
and effort spent in searching for sellers in a market.  Ratchford (1982) observes that 
higher relative valuation and large dispersion of prices increases the gains from search, 
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thus leading to greater search.  He suggests that education, a proxy for search efficiency, 
has a positive impact on search whereas income, a proxy for opportunity costs of time, 
has a negative impact on search intensity.  Using a survey methodology, Ratchford and 
Srinivasan (1993) also find that search intensity (measured as the time spent searching for 
price) increases with perceived benefits of search, whereas it decreases with consumer 
knowledge and hourly wage.   
Schmidt and Spreng (1996) provide an extensive review of research on the 
determinants of search intensity and develop a model integrating the psychological search 
and economics of information (EOI) literatures.  They propose that the individual, 
situational, and environmental variables determining search are mediated by ability to 
search, motivation to search, and the cost and benefits of search.  Such a cost benefit 
framework has also been employed in online markets (Klein and Ford 2003) and thus, is 
likely to be relevant within the sponsored search context.   
Price Search versus Quality Search 
A fundamental tenet underlying descriptive and normative models of consumer search is 
that consumers differ in terms of their needs and pro uct attribute preferences (Bell and 
Lattin 1998).  The two most important attributes of a product or service are price and 
quality, and consumers vary in terms of the weight tha they attach to these attributes in 
their purchase decision (Wolinsky 1983; Levin and Johnson 1984).  As a result, the type 
of information (i.e., price versus quality) sought and acquired by a consumer depends on 
their product attribute preference.  For example, quality seeking consumers have higher 
willingness to pay for any quality level as compared to low quality valuation consumers 
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(Wolinsky 1983; Desai 2001) and therefore will search for high quality sellers rather than 
low price sellers.   
Quality versus price preferences are known to affect a consumer’s search cost, as 
collecting and comparing quality information is costlier than collecting and comparing 
price information (Nelson 1970).  Today, Internet technologies alter the cost of collecting 
price and/or quality information and thus, significantly affect consumer behavior (Smith 
2001).  For instance, research on consumer search behavior in an online environments 
suggests that the differential search cost for obtaining quality information vis-à-vis price 
information may affect price sensitivity (Lynch and Ariely 2000; Diehl, Kornish et al. 
2003).  Given the importance of the price and quality ttributes from consumers’ as well 
as sellers’ perspectives, I focus on differences across consumers in terms of their price 
versus quality preference and their search objectivs.   
Positioning Strategies and Competition 
Sellers in a market compete with each other by employing different positioning strategies 
to attract their target consumer segment.  There is an extensive literature on the impact of 
competitive positioning on firms’ performance in traditional non-directional markets 
(Economides 1986; Deephouse 1999; Netz and Taylor 2002).  Researchers examining 
such traditional markets or media generally assume that consumers sample firms 
randomly while searching a medium such as the yellow pages (Perry and Wigderson 
1986).  However, the sponsored search medium creates an nvironment where the order 
in which the firms are searched is known i.e., the order in which the firms are searched is 
a function of the rank of the firm on the listing (Arbatskaya forthcoming).  The ordered 
presentation format limits the freedom and flexibility that a consumer may have in 
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browsing advertisements.  In related search contexts, researchers have found that the 
ordinal ranking of the firms is strongly related to a consumer’s likelihood of visiting a 
firm and purchasing from it (Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001; Ellison and Ellison 2004).  
This pattern of search where consumers find it natural o search from top to bottom of the 
listing creates a directional market.   
A directional market is one where a consumers’ search cost or transportation cost to 
visit sellers in the market depends not only on the distance between the consumers’ 
location and the location of the firm, but also on the direction in which a firm is located 
(Nilssen 1997).  For example, parking garages on a e-way street represent a directional 
market, where it is more costly for a driver to retu n to the garage that is behind her 
versus going to a garage ahead, irrespective of the distance between the garages (Lai 
2001).  Another dimension on which markets may exhibit directionality is temporal 
space, as in markets for radio or television programming and transportation services such 
as airline flights.  Here, it might be less costly for a consumer to wait a while, relative to 
her ideal time, than to arrive earlier (or later depending on the context) in order to get 
serviced (Cancian, Bills et al. 1995; Nilssen 1997). 
In sponsored search markets, the directionality arises due to cognitive burden as it is 
cognitively “costlier” for a typical consumer to visit sellers at the bottom of the list before 
visiting the sellers at the top of the listing.  This directionality, where consumers search 
the sellers in the market in the order in which their ads are displayed in the listing, affects 
the distribution of consumers that each firm encounters.  As one might expect, both the 
strategies employed by firms as well as the resulting competition dynamics in such an 
ordered medium are likely be different that those in the traditional medium (Perry and 
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Wigderson 1986; Arbatskaya forthcoming).  Much of the consumer search literature 
addresses behaviors in traditional non-directional se rch market with one notable 
exception (Arbatskaya forthcoming).  As sponsored search markets become increasingly 
popular venues for advertising, research examining the relationship between consumer 
behavior and seller strategies in such directional markets is needed. 
In summary, the unique attributes of sponsored search markets and the nature of 
online competition in these markets require firms to eek appropriate means to 
differentiate themselves from their rivals.  Prior research has suggested that consumers 
vary in the intensity with which they search and have heterogeneous preferences in 
regard to the product attributes (price or quality) they value.  To the extent that the 
sponsored search market is inherently directional in nature, consumer search behavior is 
also affected by the order in which firms are listed in the search results.  I use these 
insights from prior work to develop testable hypotheses in the following section. 
 
2.3 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES  
Specific instantiations of the conceptual constructs are depicted in the research model 
(see Figure 2.2).  The key outcome of interest is the performance of the focal firm in the 
sponsored search market, operationalized as the CTR of its ad.  Theoretical arguments for 
each of the proposed relationships are provided below. 
Sequential Search 
The typical format of a sponsored search listing is a display of an ordered list of firms 
along with their advertising messages.  It has been observed that when presented with an 
ordered list of items, individuals tend to browse through them sequentially in the order in 
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which they are listed.  For instance, a recent eye motion study shows that searchers scan a 
listing from top to bottom and they pay more attention on the advertisements appearing 
on the top of the listing (Sherman 2005).  This sequential search creates a directional 
market, where firms listed on the top have an advantage over firms appearing lower in the 
listing.  In addition, consumers are likely to vary in their search intensity due to 
differences in perceived search costs and benefits (Stigler 1961).  Thus, while all 
consumers may search sequentially from the top to the bottom, consumers with higher 
search costs (or lower search intensity) will restrict heir search to the top sellers in the 
list.  By contrast, consumers with lower search costs (higher search intensity) are more 
likely to search further down the listing.  Given the tendency for consumers to search 
sequentially and the heterogeneity in consumer search intensity, more consumers are 
likely to click on sellers with a higher rank/placem nt.  I therefore test:  
H1: Sellers ranked higher in a sponsored search listing have higher CTR than those 
ranked lower in the search listing.   
The Impact of a Firm’s Unique Selling Proposition (USP) 
While a naive sequential search strategy might be realistic in simple settings, it is likely 
to be less so in a more complex and high-involvement s tting such as shopping or 
purchase.  In a shopping situation consumers typically seek products and services that 
meet their needs.  As discussed earlier, consumers can broadly be classified as price-
seeking or quality-seeking, based on their preference for price and quality (Wolinsky 
1983; Levin and Johnson 1984; Desai 2001).  A price-se king consumer is more likely to 
search for low-priced offerings, while a quality-seeking consumer is likely to search for 
high-quality offerings.  Thus, while all consumers may search sequentially through the 
25 
ordered listing, consumers with specific preferences for certain attributes are likely to 
filter out those sellers which do not appear to provide the feature/attribute that is being 
sought.  In other words, a consumer who is quality seeking has higher likelihood of 
visiting sellers signaling higher quality, while a price seeking consumer is more likely to 
sample sellers that signal lower prices.  Because firms use their ad creative to 
differentiate themselves and convey their unique selling proposition (USP) to potential 
customers, consumers will select sellers whose USP signals the attribute they value.  
Thus, the seller’s USP as highlighted in the ad creativ , in addition to its rank in the 
listing, would affect the performance of sponsored s arch advertisements.  I therefore 
test: 
H2a: The CTR of a seller in a sponsored search listing is influenced by the seller’s 
positioning strategy as highlighted by the USP in its ad creative. 
 
 
Sponsored Search Listing as a Filter 
Given the directional nature of the sponsored search market, the effectiveness of a firm’s 
positioning strategy is likely to be moderated by its rank in the listing.  Prior research 
suggests a correspondence between consumers’ needs and search intensity, stemming 
from differences in perceived costs and benefits of earch.  For instance, search costs and 
benefits for a consumer are a function of the consumer’s individual characteristics (i.e., 
income, education, etc.) as well as the product attribu e that is being searched (i.e., cost of 
searching and comparing different attributes and the utility derived from the attributes).  
Therefore, consumers searching for product attributes that have greater net marginal 
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benefit from an additional search or/and who have lower opportunity cost of time due to 
their individual characteristics would exhibit higher search intensity (Schmidt and Spreng 
1996).  Because consumers search sequentially from top to bottom of the listing, those 
with higher search intensity will search further down the listing whereas those with lower 
search intensity would restrict their search to the top few advertisers in the listing.  It 
follows then that the proportion of consumers with a specific product attribute preference 
will vary as an ad is moved down the listing.  I label this phenomenon that changes the 
composition of consumers likely to see a seller on the sponsored search listing as the 
“sponsored search filter” (see Figure 2.3).  Because the proportion of consumers 
searching for a specific product attribute varies across different ranks due to the 
sponsored search filter effect, the performance of a seller’s USP would depend on the 
rank on which the seller appears on the listing.  Therefore, I test: 
H2b: The effect of a seller’s  USP on CTR will be moderated by the rank at which the 
seller appears on the sponsored search listing.   
Next I develop specific hypotheses regarding the diff rential effect of price and 
quality USPs at different ranks.  In general, price se king consumers are likely to have 
higher search intensities than quality seeking consumers for at least three reasons.  First, 
searching for quality can be more time consuming than searching for price – research 
suggests that quality information is more expensive to collect and process as compared to 
price information (Nelson 1970).  Assessing and comparing quality of sellers in an online 
environment is even more difficult than offline markets where other “physical” signals of 
quality are frequently available, whereas price comparison across sellers online is more 
objective and thus easier.  Therefore, quality seeking consumers would not consider it 
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worthwhile to search more, and will be more likely to restrict their search to sellers in the 
top ranks.   
A second effect is due to the relationship between income, search cost, and 
preferences of a consumer.  Research suggests that income is associated with preferences 
for higher quality products.  According to the “relative income hypothesis,” income is 
linearly and positively related to consumption of exp nsive or high quality products 
(Schaninger 1981).  High income consumers are less price sensitive across various 
product categories (Ainslie and Rossi 1998) and low income consumers typically search 
for low prices (Andrews and Currim 2002).  Income has also been identified as a 
determinant of the search cost.  As might be expected, the marginal cost of an 
incremental search effort (i.e., the opportunity cost of time) is higher for a consumer with 
a higher income (Stigler 1961; Ratchford 1982; Ratchford and Srinivasan 1993).  Given 
the existence of a sponsored search filter effect, a larger proportion of consumers that 
reach the bottom ranks in the listing would belong to the low income group.  To the 
degree that the higher income group attaches greater weight to the quality dimension than 
the price dimension vis-à-vis the low income group, firms at higher ranks will receive a 
larger proportion of quality seeking consumers as compared to firms at lower ranks. 
Finally, if consumers believe that sellers on the top positions are of higher quality – 
either due to 1) awareness of sponsored search mechanism along with advertisement 
signaling beliefs or 2) a lack of knowledge about the distinction between organic and 
sponsored ads and a transfer of positive experience from top ranked results on the organic 
search listing to the sponsored listing –quality seeking consumers would concentrate their 
search efforts on the sellers appearing on the top of the listing.  As a consequence, a 
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larger proportion of consumers that reach the bottom ranks in the listings are more likely 
to be price seekers.  I therefore test: 
H2c: The relative performance (i.e., CTR) of a price USP as compared to a quality 
USP will improve at lower ranks in the sponsored search listing. 
 
The Impact of Competition 
Given limited attention and memory, consumers are more likely to compare adjacent 
sellers offering the attribute that is being sought before visiting a seller’s website.  As 
stated earlier, consumers are likely to click on the seller with a USP that matches their 
preference.  To the extent that a consumer’s comparison set consists of adjacent sellers in 
a listing, the constitution of this comparison set hould influence the CTR received by a a 
focal firm.  In particular, the greater the number of firms with an identical USP within the 
comparison set, the higher the competitive intensity.  Assuming that consumers select a 
subset of sellers from a group of adjacent sellers employing a similar USP while 
searching sequentially from top to bottom of the listings, due to market fragmentation, 
the presence of higher competitive intensity in the seller’s USP space will lower the 
clickthrough received by the firm.  Hence,  
H3a: In a sponsored search listing, higher competitive intensity (i.e., more firms 
around a focal firm that are using the same USP) for a USP will lead to lower CTR 
for a seller with that USP. 
Finally, since quality seeking consumers have higher search costs and lower search 
intensity, they will sample fewer sellers from their comparison set vis-à-vis price seeking 
consumers who have higher search intensity.  Therefore the effect of competition will be 
more pronounced for a quality USP than for a price USP.   
H3b:  The impact of competitive intensity will be stronger for a seller using a quality 
USP relative to a seller using a price USP. 
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2.4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 Empirical Context 
The analysis is based on data from a field experiment fi ld experiment conducted in 
conjunction with a firm in the mortgage industry (henceforth MorgSeller) that bids for 
placement on one of the largest sponsored search markets.  The key strategic choices 
facing the firm are the rank at which it will be displayed in the listing (determined by the 
amount it bids) and the specific differentiation it w ll highlight in the text message 
accompanying its advertisement.  MorgSeller randomly varies the keywords and 
associated USP it utilizes in the market, and changes its bids for placement dynamically.  
Through this experimentation, its objective is to find the optimal rank given a choice of 
keyword such that CTR is maximized.  The data contains MorgSeller’s bids for the top 
36 (based on clickthroughs) keywords (e.g., loans, mortgages, home loans, etc.) and the 
ranks obtained in the sponsored search listings corresponding to each of those bids.  
MorgSeller provided us with data for a period of three months in 2006.  The key 
variables of interest are MorgSeller’s rank in the sponsored search listings, and the USP 
as highlighted in its ad creatives, while the key outc me of interest is the CTR obtained.  
The bids were updated frequently and resulted in different ranks over time and for 
different keywords.  In addition, the ad creative (i. ., two lines of text advertisement with 
30-40 characters in each line) to be displayed on the listings, used by MorgSeller was 
varied over time and across keywords.  Two broad positioning strategies were chosen – 
price and quality, and the ad creatives employed highlight either a quality or a price USP.  
Ad creatives using a quality USP generally included words such as “customer 
satisfaction”, “trusted”, “secure and confidential”, “quick and easy” whereas price USP 
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ads used phrases such as “no closing cost”, “low rates”, “lowest price”, “low interest”, 
“compare offers”. 
In addition to data on MorgSeller’s strategic choices with regard to rank and ad USP, 
I also obtained the corresponding performance data, i.e., clickthrough rate.  To measure 
competition, I further, collected data on the USP of competitors in the sponsored search 
listing on the selected keywords.  The competition data were compiled by extracting the 
keywords in the sample from the search engine result page every two hours.  Then, using 
content analysis and identifying a set of words that capture the essence of price and 
quality USPs, I classified the ad creatives used by these competitors as a price or a 
quality USP.  Four marketing experts, who were blind to the objective of the research 
study, were asked to classify a sample of ads into quality and price USPs.  The agreement 
of the experts for the USP classification was assessed using inter-rater reliability tests for 
nominal data (Hughes and Garrett 1990).  I obtained a Cohen's kappa agreement index of 
0.69, indicating a high degree of inter-rater reliabi ty (Landis and Koch 1977). 
I used different “windows of competition” to identify competitors adjacent to the 
seller.  I created multiple competition indices based on different windows to test for the 
robustness of the results.  For the smallest window, I used one advertisement above 
MorgSeller’s advertisement and one advertisement below MorgSeller to define adjacent 
competitors.  The competitive intensity for a USP is obtained by dividing the number of 
advertisements using that USP by the number of adjacent ads.  
The unit of analysis is the combination of a unique advertisement (i.e., unique text) 
appearing on a listing on a specific day.  Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients 
between the variables used in this study are shown in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, 
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respectively.  The sample contains 1556 observations appearing at ranks in the range of 1 
to 7.  Of these observations, 757 ads employed a quality USP and 799 ads contained a 




I employ moderated multiple regression (MMR) analysis to test the hypotheses.  I log 
transform the rank variable to capture the exponential decay in clickthrough rate as a 
function of seller rank on the listing3.  The dependent variable, CTR, is defined as the 
number of clicks received by a seller (i.e., the number of consumers who clicked on the 
seller) divided by the number of impressions received by the seller (i.e., the number of 
consumers who were shown the seller’s ad).  The use of uch a normalized dependent 
variable is necessary to avoid the problem due to variations in the number of impressions 
obtained by sellers’ ads.   
Finally, although the CTR by virtue of being normalized takes into account 
differences in clicks due to differences in impression , it still suffers from some 
measurement issues.  I assume that the CTR obtained by a seller is a reliable estimate of 
the true effectiveness of the seller’s ad.  However th  estimate of effectiveness is not 
reliable if the number of impressions obtained by an advertisement is small.  I, therefore, 
weight each observation in the regression model such that observations with higher 
impressions get a larger weight when the least square errors are minimized in the 
regression analysis.  I assume that after a threshold number of impressions the CTR 
estimate would be very close to the true value.  In other words, I model the reliability of 
                                               
3 I tested a linear model (i.e., without log transformation) and find that log-transformation explains larger 
variation in the data.  I also conducted additional regressions to examine the model using linear 
relationships between rank and click-through and obtained results similar to those with the exponential 
relationship. 
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an ad’s effectiveness measure as a concave function of mpressions and therefore weight 
the observations by log(impressions).  I analyzed th  data without using the weights and 
found the results to be consistent.  The results report d here are based on the weighted 
regression.   
The regression model that I employ to test the research hypotheses is shown below. 
CTR = α0 + β1*log(Rank) + β2*USP + β3*log(Rank)*USP + β4*CI + β5*CI*USP + 
β6*CI*log(Rank) + β7*CI*log(Rank)*USP + Σi=2..j(δi*Keywordi) + ε  
   
where  j = total number of keywords 
CTR:  Clickthrough rate 
Rank:  Position of a seller’s ad on the listing.  Top rank is coded as 1 
USP:  Unique selling proposition employed by the seller in its ad.  USP is 
coded as1 for price and 0 for quality USP    
CI:   Competitive intensity on the USP that is employed by the seller. 
   
As described earlier, CTR is calculated by dividing the number of clicks received on 
an advertisement by number of impressions for the adv rtisement.  Rank represents the 
rank (daily average) at which the advertisement was shown in the sponsored listing.  
Rank equals 1 for the advertisement shown on top of the listing, 2 for the advertisement 
shown below it and so on.  Thus, a lower value of rank implies that the advertisement 
appeared towards the top of the listing.  USP is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
advertisement conveys a low price USP and is 0 if the ad conveys a high quality USP.  CI 
represents the competitive intensity around an advertisement on the specific USP 
dimension that the ad employs.  A seller one rank above the focal seller and a seller one 
rank below the focal seller are used to create the competitive intensity measure4.  Finally 
                                               
4 To test the robustness of the results, I also usedwin ows of two as well as three sellers above and below to 
create the competitive intensity variable.  The results are consistent across these different “windows f 
competition”.  I present the results based on the smallest “window of competition” – comprising of one s ller 
above and one below the focal firm.  
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keyword dummies are used as a control variable to account fr differences in CTR due to 
the inherent nature of the keyword. 
 
2.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results of the regression analysis are presented i  Table 2.3.  In Model 1, I include 
only the keyword dummies to account for the differences in CTR across different 
keywords.  The results show, not surprisingly, thatkeywords have a significant impact on 
the CTR of an ad, suggesting that consumers differ in the likelihood of clicking on a 
particular ad on the basis of the keywords that they use to search.  Next, in model 2 I 
include rank of the ad as an independent variable.  I find that, as expected, advertisements 
placed higher in the listings get higher CTR.  I graph the predicted relationship between 
rank and CTR in Figure 2.4.  Model 3 includes the eff ct of USP after controlling for the 
rank of the ad.  In Model 4, I include the interaction effect between rank and USP to test 
hypothesis H2b and H2c.  Model 5 introduces the competitive intensity (CI) variable to 
test hypothesis H3a and Model 6 introduces the interac ion term between CI and USP to 
test hypothesis H3b.  Although, a priori, I did not hypothesize a higher order interaction 
between CI, USP, and rank, such a relationship is pos ible.  Since omitting higher order 
interactions if the true effects are non-zero would bias the lower order coefficients, I also 
test for the presence of a three-way interaction in Model 7 (Aiken and West 1991)5.   
I find that the coefficient of the higher order interaction is significant (beta=-0.063; 
p<.001) and the increase in r-square by including this interaction is also significant (∆R-
square=0.02; F=25.21).  Due to the presence of the 3-way interaction, it is advisable to 
                                               
5 The multicollinearity diagnostics were acceptable (VIF scores were less than 10) thus alleviating concer s 
regarding unstable coefficients.  
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focus on the fully specified model (i.e., Model 7) rather than interpreting the partial 
models (Aiken and West 1991).  Therefore, I plot the t ree-way interaction to validate the 
hypotheses.   
In Figure 2.5a and 2.5b, I graph the interaction betwe n rank and USP at different 
levels of competition.  Results show that CTR decreases at lower ranks.  For the price 
USP this difference is significant at a 10% level of significance for both low and high 
competition (difference=0.01; p=0.062 and differenc=0.008; p=.053, respectively).  For 
the quality USP the difference is significant at 5%in both low and high competition cases 
(difference=0.075; p<.01 and difference=0.026; p<.01, respectively).  Thus I find support 
for H1.   
The graphs also show that the quality USP performs better than the price USP in 
generating higher CTR at the top ranks but the relationship reverses at the bottom ranks.  
In the presence of low competition, the difference between the price and quality USPs is -
0.028 (p<0.01) at the top and 0.036 (p<.01) at the bottom.  In cases with higher 
competition, the results are similar but are not sta istically significant.  The difference 
between price and quality USP is -0.01 (p=0.117) at the top and 0.01 (p=0.163) at the 
bottom.  I do not find a significant main effect of USP on CTR.  Thus H2a is not 
supported.  Though the main effect is not significant, s hypothesized, I find that the 
effect of USP on CTR varies as a function of rank.  However the results show that the 
relationship between the ad’s USP and its rank in the listing is strongly moderated by the 
advertiser’s ability to differentiate itself from its rivals.  Thus, I find conditional support 
(i.e., only when competitive intensity is low) for H2b and H2c.  
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I graph the three-way interaction in Figure 2.6a and 2.6b to examine the relationship 
between competitive intensity and USP at top and bottom ranks.  Results show that high 
competitive intensity significantly decreases the CTR for the quality USP (difference=-
0.22; p<0.01) at the top ranks.  The effect of competition on the price USP is also in the 
same direction but is not significant (difference=-0.003; p=0.577).  This is consistent with 
hypotheses H3a and H3b.  At the bottom ranks, the effect of competition on price USP is 
similar as in top ranks (difference=-0.00002; p=0.997).  However the effect of 
competition on the quality USP at the bottom ranks is quite surprising and contrary to 
expectations.  I find that higher competitive intensity on the quality USP at the bottom 
rank leads to higher CTR as compared to lower competitive intensity (difference=-0.027; 
p<0.01).  
In summary, I find that the magnitude of decrease in CTR as an ad is moved from top 
rank to bottom rank is much larger for the quality USP in comparison to the price USP.  
This result is consistent with the sponsored search filter effect described earlier, and I 
find that the performance of the price USP vis-à-vis the quality USP improves as I move 
down the listing.  Further, competitive intensity has a significant effect on CTR but the 
effect is present only in the case of the quality USP.  At the top ranks, higher competitive 
intensity lowers the CTR for the quality USP but surprisingly, higher competition on 
quality USP increases the CTR at the bottom ranks.   
The effect of competition at lower ranks in the listing for the quality USP is 
unexpected and seemingly counter-intuitive.  One possible explanation for this effect is 
that it is caused by differences in the profile of c nsumers who reach the bottom of the 
listing as compared with that of consumers who stopearching at the top of the listing.  
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High competitive intensity affects the quality USP more at the top as quality seeking 
consumers are sampling fewer of the adjoining quality USP ads, in contrast to price 
seeking consumers who are sampling more (perhaps, exhaustively) adjoining price USP 
ads.  However at the bottom, more intense competition does not have the same effect for 
quality as it is not the quality seeking consumers but the price seeking consumers who are 
clicking on these ads.  As I argued earlier (and based on the indirect evidence provided 
by the results) a majority of consumers who visit a seller’s ad at the bottom of the listing 
would be price seeking.  Also, recall that I assumed that though consumers are more 
likely to click on an ad that has the USP which matches their preferences, some 
consumers (i.e. β proportion of quality seeking and γ proportion of price seeking) may 
sample ads that do not specifically claim the attribute that they are seeking when they do 
not have enough6 ads to sample in a “sliding window”.  Of the price s eking consumers 
who may click on the quality USP ad, a larger number would click on the quality USP if 
they do not have enough price USP alternatives to sample.  This is the case when there is 
high quality competition (i.e., adjoining sellers have the quality USP) and therefore we 
may see the counterintuitive result.   
Limitations 
Prior to discussing the implications of the findings, I acknowledge the limitations of the 
study.  Or empirical analysis is restricted to data from a single firm, that somewhat limits 
its generalizability.  Nevertheless, it is important to note that the unit of analysis is not the 
firm but rather the specific differentiation strategy, i.e., USP deployed at a given rank.  
MorgSeller experimented with both these key strategic variables, permitting us to test the 
                                               
6 Number of ads that a consumer would sample from a window would also depend on their search intensity. 
The larger the search intensity, the larger the number of ads clicked in any sliding window. 
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assertions in the research model.  Moreover, the use of a single firm allows us to control 
for a number of other firm-specific factors such as brand-name (Wu et al. 2005), that 
might affect the outcomes of interest in this study.  B  focusing on a single firm I was 
able to effectively isolate the impact of the firm's competitive and positioning strategies, 
in these markets.  The data used in this study is also limited to the mortgage industry.  
This choice is primarily driven by the popularity of online mortgage services which 
provides us sufficient number of clickthroughs to perform empirical analyses.  I believe 
the results would also hold in other industries, though the strength of the relationships 
may vary. Extending this study to encompass other sectors would be an interesting 
avenue for future studies.  Another potential limitation of this study is that I measure only 
CTRs rather than actual purchases.  However, CTRs are considered to be the primary 
performance metric by practitioners as they are a good predictor of sales.  To the degree 
that different product categories may have different conversion rates, it would be 
important for future researchers to understand the effect of firms' positioning strategies 
on conversion rates and sales.  Finally, while I am able to observe consumers' actions (i.e. 
their click-throughs) I do not directly observe indivi ual consumers' search behavior, or 
their preferences.  Future research should validate the assumptions of this study by 
conducting complementary studies employing lab experiment and survey methodology. 
 
 
2.6 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS  
My goal in this essay was to extend understanding of the performance of ads in 
sponsored search listings by moving beyond a uni-dimensional focus of ad rank as the 
determinant of performance.  We examined, both theoretically and empirically, how the 
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interaction between an advertiser’s USP as highlighted in its “ad-creative”, the rank of 
the ad, and the competitive intensity around the ad influences the effectiveness of the 
sponsored search ad.  Results largely support our predictions, suggesting that these 
factors are important strategic variables for firms competing in these markets. 
The study makes several theoretical contributions.  It integrates consumer search 
theory with directional search to provide insights into consumer search and seller’s 
differentation strategy in sponsored search markets.  I proposed and found evidence that 
the sequential nature of search in such markets results in the sponsored search listing 
becoming a consumer segmentation filter.  Not only is the number of consumers who 
click at the top larger than those who click at the bottom, as might be expected, a striking 
finding is that consumers who reach the bottom may be more homogenous in certain 
characteristics such as search intensity, income, product attribute preferences, etc.  The 
findings provide indirect evidence of consumer search patterns in sponsored search 
listings, and can assist analytical modelers and auction designers in developing more 
realistic models.   
In addition to theoretical contributions, the study yields several managerial 
implications.  First, I reaffirm the widespread belief that higher ranking of the 
advertisement leads to better performance (i.e., higher clickthroughs).  However, the 
ranking in the search results explains only a small (around 5%) proportion of the variance 
in the clickthrough rates that the firm obtains.  A key implication of this finding is that 
the forecasting models used by the search engine marketers and advertisers that only 
include rank as the predictor of clickthroughs would not only be misleading, but may also 
result in sub-optimal bidding strategies.   
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The results indicate that both the firm’s USP as well as the competitive intensity 
around the focal firm’s position have a significant impact on the advertisement’s 
performance.  In general, the price USP performs better than the quality USP at lower 
ranks.  This finding yields a number of interesting and important implications.  First, 
most of the advertisers (or search engine marketers who advertise on behalf of their 
clients) typically treat rank and USP as independent cisions.  However the results 
suggest that firms should seek to jointly optimize th se two decision variables.   
A second implication is the need for sellers to build web-based information systems 
capable of capturing the rank of the ad in the sponored search listing at which the 
consumer clicked to visit a seller’s site.  This information can then be used in conjunction 
with consumers’ demographics and psychographics (if available) to obtain insights into 
the differences between the profile of consumers who encounter the seller’s ad at 
different ranks in the listing, and to make sharper pr dictions about consumer purchase 
behavior.   
Third, a seller would find it useful to customize its landing page (i.e., the web page 
that a consumer is taken to when she clicks on an ad i the sponsored search listing) for 
ads shown at different ranks.  For example, if a seller’s ad is appearing at the bottom 
rank, then the seller can customize its page to fit the information needs and preferences of 
a price seeking consumer profile and may even post lower prices.  By contrast, if a seller 
is listed at the top, it can afford to set higher prices and customize its site to cater to 
quality seeking consumers.  Further, a seller can dynamically set the price on a landing 
page depending on the rank at which the ad linked to this landing page appears on the 
listing.  Finally, a quality seller may benefit more from bidding higher to appear at the top 
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of the listing as a majority of the consumers who are quality seeking may not even see the 
seller if its ad appears at the bottom of the listing.  Sellers competing on price can, 
however, afford to be at the lower ranks.  Although this strategy would lower their 
clickthrough (due to the lower rank), it would draw  more homogenous set of consumers 
(in terms of their search intensity and other factors hat determine search intensity or are 
related to search intensity) to the seller’s websit and thus, a seller may be able to get 
higher sales by developing a more targeted marketing s rategy.   
The assertion that quality seeking consumers may be concentrated at the top of the 
listing also has implications for the design of thesponsored search mechanism.  The 
search engine intermediaries need to design the ranking mechanism to ensure that the 
sellers at the top of the listing are high quality sellers.  Else, in the long run at equilibrium 
the quality seeking consumers may stop using the sponsored search results.  
Interestingly, I also find that the quality USP is strongly affected by competitive 
intensity.  As expected, the effect is negative at the top ranks but reverses at the bottom 
ranks.  The proposed explanation suggests that this is due to price seeking consumers 
clicking on the quality USP ads when they do not have enough price USP ads to sample 
at the bottom.  This may, however, have implications for the conversion rate (i.e., the 
number of sales divided by the number of clicks/visits) of the quality ads when they are at 
the bottom amidst high quality USP competition.  It is possible that in such an 
environment the conversion rate of an ad may be lowr.  Although I did not examine the 
conversion rate, future research can investigate this issue more closely and study the 
impact of clickthroughs on conversion rate.  One important implication of this finding is 
that advertisers, especially those who are using a quality USP, should develop 
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information systems to monitor the competition on the sponsored search listing to better 
predict fluctuations in their CTR, and to make more informed decisions regarding what 
ranks to obtain for their ads for different keywords in the advertiser’s keyword portfolio.  
As opposed to just the rank of the ad, the advertisers hould also include the historical 
competitive intensity, USP and the ad’s rank to forecast future CTR to obtain better 
forecasting estimates and to arrive at an optimal bidding strategy for the sponsored search 
auctions.  
Future Research 
Several promising new avenues for research in this nascent field emerge from this study.  
First, researchers can build on this study by using complementary research methods.  
Controlled lab experiments can be designed to directly xamine the consumer behavior 
that was inferred in this study and to address some f the other limitations of the study 
described earlier.  Consumer surveys can also be condu ted to identify the profile of 
consumers who search till the bottom of the listing a d how this profile differs from those 
who stop at the top.  Further, if sellers start tracking the rank at which a consumer saw an 
ad, researchers can use this secondary data to triangulate findings about consumer search 
behavior in the sponsored search listings.   
I examined competition in terms of the USP on which the firms were competing.  
Future research can develop alternative metrics for competitive intensity (for instance, 
competition based on a firm’s brand equity).  It is possible that competition from firms 
which have greater market share (or brand recognitin) han the focal firm would lower 
the performance of focal firm’s advertisement.  Finally, researchers can analyze data 
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collected from firms in different industries to examine the sensitivity and robustness of 
the findings.   
 
2.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Researchers believe that differentiation strategies employed by firms and the resulting 
competitive dynamics in directional markets may be different from those created by 
traditional formats (Perry and Wigderson 1986; Arbatsk ya forthcoming).  However, 
very few empirical studies have examined the nature and outcomes of competition in 
such online markets and the various differentiation strategies adopted by firms competing 
in an environment characterized by very high competitiv  intensity and a growing 
number of rivals.  The exclusive focus on the rank of firms in the sponsored search 
listings as a driver of performance adopted both researchers and practitioners fails to 
account for the unique characteristics of sponsored search markets, and the ability of 
firms to differentiate themselves in such contexts.  In contrast to extant research that has 
adopted an auction perspective to understand the dynamics between search intermediaries 
and sellers, in this study I adopted an alternative consumer search perspective.  Findings 
from this study can aid firms in optimizing their sponsored search strategies.  Tracking 
and accounting for a range of variables (in addition o rank) in forecasting models can 
improve the prediction accuracy of clickthrough rates.  The results of this study are not 
only likely to be useful for managers seeking to analyze the competition and craft their 
best response to their competitors’ positioning strategies, they also extend existing 
research on directional markets to a new and emerging empirical context.  Finally, to the 
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best of my knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of positioning 




CHAPTER 3: ADVERTISING OR PRICE? THE EFFICACY OF QU ALITY 
INFORMATIONAL CUES IN ONLINE SPONSORED SEARCH MARKE TS 
 
ABSTRACT 
The digitization of commerce has caused fundamental changes in consumer information 
search and use.  With an increasing number of consumers using search engines as an 
integral component of their online purchase process, online sponsored search markets, 
such as those provided by Google and Yahoo!, have emerged as a dominant customer 
acquisition mechanism for sellers.  Given the extent of information asymmetry in online 
markets, consumers rely on a number of informational cues or signals to infer the quality 
of sellers in these markets – advertising and price being the two most important among 
them.  While the importance of advertising and price as signals of quality has been well 
established in traditional markets, online sponsored search markets have a number of 
unique characteristics that differentiate them from traditional settings.  This calls for an 
examination of the efficacy of different informational cues for consumers’ search and 
transaction behaviors in online sponsored search markets.  Using a lab experiment, I 
examine how the knowledge of firms’ relative advertising expenditures and prices affect 
consumers’ search and purchase decisions.  Contrary to earlier findings of the dominance 
of price signals in traditional markets, I find that firms’ relative advertising expenditures 
serve as a stronger signal of quality in online spon ored search markets – a result 
attributable to the directional nature of these markets.  I also find that the risk attitude of 
consumers has a significant impact on consumer beliefs and market outcomes.  I discuss 
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the implications of the findings for sellers and consumers using sponsored search 
markets, as well as for search intermediaries.   
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is well established that the digitization of commerce has fundamentally altered the 
nature of information search and use for consumers.  Over 53% of prospective buyers 
search online, and 67% of online consumers seeking information use search engines as 
part of their purchase process (iCrossing 2005).  To the extent that this population of 
consumers represents an important set of prospects for firms seeking to sell products and 
services, it is not surprising that the growth of online markets has been accompanied by a 
concomitant increase in the popularity of online advertising.  Recent reports suggest that 
online advertising revenues in the U.S. for the first six months of 2005 were 
approximately $5.8 billion, representing a 26% increase over the first half of 2004 
(Interactive Advertising Bureau 2005).   
Among the various online advertising formats, sponsored search advertising is 
witnessing the fastest growth and has emerged as the dominant advertising format, 
accounting for nearly 40% of all advertising spending online (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2005).  Sponsored search advertisements are text-based advertisements that are typically 
displayed alongside “organic” (algorithm-based) search results on major search engines 
such as Google and Yahoo!  In sponsored search advertising, also known as “paid 
search,” “pay-for-placement” or “keyword” advertising, firms compete to be listed on top 
of search results generated in response to a user’s keyword query.  This form of 
promotion offers a number of significant advantages over traditional approaches, 
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including the ability to precisely target messages to potential consumers who are actively 
searching for sellers, and enabling sellers to more directly relate advertising expenditures 
to outcomes.   
A unique aspect of sponsored search is the integration nd co-evolution of search and 
advertising business models.  While it is well understood that search and advertising are 
two sides of the same coin – the objective of each being to match buyers and sellers – the 
ability of firms to target their advertising to consumers, or the ability of consumers to 
selectively seek out advertisements has been limited by the constraints imposed by 
traditional media.  Sponsored search mechanisms enable firms to overcome these 
limitations and, recognizing their value potential, firms are aggressively reallocating 
significant proportions of their advertising budgets from traditional media to online 
sponsored search.   
The sponsored search model employs an auction mechanism where firms bid on 
keywords relevant to their product or service for enhanced placement (i.e., higher rank) 
of their advertisements in the search results.  Competition for the top slots in the search 
listings is predicated on the fact that consumers primarily tend to click on sellers that 
appear higher on the list (DoubleClick 2006).  However, a vast majority of consumers 
(62%) are unaware of the distinctions between sponsored search and organic (algorithm-
based) search results (Fallows 2005).  In addition, a large proportion of consumers 
believe that a seller listed higher in the search results is of higher quality than those listed 
lower (iProspect 2006).  It is not clear how consumer behavior would change if they were 
aware of the fact that a seller appearing higher on the list pays more than the seller ranked 
lower.  This question becomes especially important in markets where consumers cannot 
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easily distinguish the quality of competing sellers, i.e., when the market exhibits quality 
uncertainty.   
Research suggests that in markets characterized by quality uncertainty consumers rely 
on informational cues or signals to infer the quality of sellers (Kirmani and Wright 1989), 
advertising and price being the two most important among them.  This is particularly true 
in online settings where consumers confront significant information asymmetries (Baylis 
and Perloff 2002).  While it has been found that consumers shopping online rely on brand 
name to infer retailer’s quality in non-contractible aspects of the product and service 
bundle such as shipping reliability (Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001), the nascence of online 
markets and the lack of geographical constraints expose consumers to new firms and 
unknown sellers.  This “long tail” of tens of thousands of small businesses, not being 
served by conventional means of advertising (Anderson 2005), diminishes the role of 
brand name in consumer decision making, and increases the reliance on other indirect 
informational cues such as advertising and the price charged by the sellers.   
Although the importance of advertising and price as signals of quality have been well 
established in traditional markets (Peterson 1970; Gerstner 1985; Milgrom and Roberts 
1986; Kirmani and Wright 1989), little is known about their effects on consumer 
behavior in electronic markets.  In particular, online sponsored search markets have 
several unique characteristics that differentiate them from traditional contexts.  Unlike 
traditional media settings where firms pay for advertising using a pay-per-exposure 
model, in online sponsored search contexts, firms pay-per-click.  The former mode of 
advertising requires significant lump-sum investments, while the latter makes it 
economically feasible for smaller and less well-established firms to compete more 
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intensely for customers.  Further, sponsored search listings create a “directional” market 
where consumers find it easier to search and visit the sellers in a sequential order from 
top to bottom.  The implications of market directionality on consumer behavior have not 
been addressed in the literature. 
This research is motivated by the growing popularity of online markets and the fact 
that consumer behavior in the type of unique informational environment created by 
sponsored search advertising is not well understood.  I focus on the effects of 
informational cues on consumer behavior and examine the relative importance of price 
and advertising as quality signals in search and purchase decisions.  I use data from a 
laboratory experiment to address four specific research questions: 1) Can sponsored 
search advertising serve as a signal of quality and if so, under what circumstances? 2) 
How do perceptions about the correlation between a seller’s advertising expenditure and 
quality affect consumers’ search and purchase behavior? 3) How does the price signal 
influence consumers’ reliance on advertising signals in their purchase decisions? , and 4) 
How does the risk attitude of consumers affect their reliance on indirect cues provided by 
the informational environment?   
The findings show that in contrast to behavior in traditional markets where price 
tends to be the dominant signal of quality, firms’ relative advertising expenditures serve 
as a stronger signal of quality in online sponsored s arch markets – a result attributable to 
the directional nature of the online setting.  I also find that the risk attitude of consumers 
has a significant impact on consumer beliefs and market outcomes.  I discuss the 
implications of the findings for sellers and consumers using sponsored search markets, as 
well as for search intermediaries. 
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 previews the sponsored 
search literature and other relevant literature from economics, marketing and information 
systems that has studied consumer search and purchase behavior under quality 
uncertainty.  In section 3.3, I present the research hypotheses.  The research methodology 
is described in section 3.4, followed by results in ection 3.5.  Section 3.6 provides a 
discussion of the findings and their implications ad Section 3.7 concludes the chapter.     
 
3.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH  
Research from a variety of disciplines is relevant to understanding consumer behavior in 
the presence of information asymmetries.  I first review work focused specifically on the 
sponsored search context and studies that have examined the availability of information 
in online markets.  This is followed by a discussion of research related to consumer 
search, and quality signaling in markets with asymmetric information.  The overall 
conceptual model depicting the relationship between quality signals and consumer 
behavior that frames this research is shown in Figure 3.1.  Consumers are exposed to 
different signals of quality in online markets and use these signals to form beliefs about 
the extent to which specific signals denote higher quality.  These beliefs then influence 
online search and purchase behavior. 
3.2.1 Sponsored Search and Online Information Contexts 
Research on sponsored search advertising is still in a nascent stage.  Prior research in this 
field predominantly approaches the phenomenon from an auctions perspective to examine 
the interaction between market-makers and sellers who bid in these auctions.  One stream 
of research focuses on designing better rank/position allocation mechanisms from the 
perspective of the search intermediary (Aggarwal, Goel et al. 2006; Asdemir 2006; 
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Lahaie 2006; Edelman, Ostrovsky et al. forthcoming; Feng, Bhargava et al. forthcoming; 
Varian forthcoming), while a second identifies optimal bidding strategies from the 
perspective of sellers (Kitts and Leblanc 2004; Borgs, Chayes et al. 2006; 
Rusmevichientong and Williamson 2006).  In addition, a few studies examine the market 
dynamics that result from sponsored search auctions (A imesh, Ramachandran et al. 
2006; Edelman and Ostrovsky forthcoming).  However, there is limited research 
examining consumer search behavior in this context, or the implications of sponsored 
search mechanisms for seller strategies.  In one of the few academic studies on consumer 
behavior in the sponsored search context most directly related to this work, Jansen and 
Resnick (2005) examine the perception of searchers towards sponsored search listings 
and find, not surprisingly, that compared to organic search listings, consumers are 
skeptical of sponsored search results and trust them less.   
Other work in information systems has examined the impact of online markets on the 
availability of price and quality information, and how the online provision of such 
information affects consumer welfare (Bakos 1997; Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; Smith 
2001; Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001; Baye and Morgan 2002; Baylis and Perloff 2002; 
Bakos, Lucas et al. 2005).  A significant body of research also examines online consumer 
behavior (Jarvenpaa, Tractinsky et al. 2000; Koufaris 2002; Gefen, Karahanna et al. 
2003; Pavlou 2003), however, there is limited research that investigates the impact of 
online advertising on consumer behavior (Gao, Koufaris et al. 2004; Hong, Thong et al. 
2004; Wu, Cook Jr. et al. 2005).  In one of the fewinformation systems studies on online 
advertising, Gao et al. (2004) conduct an experiment to compare the effect of animated 
versus pop-up advertisements on consumers’ perceptions.  They suggest that the online 
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format and presentation of information has significant consequences for consumers’ 
perceptions and attitudes.   
As noted earlier, the sponsored search format differs rom traditional mass media in 
three key respects: 1) the spatial and temporal proximity of price and advertising 
information in sponsored search advertising facilitates consumer access to and 
comparison between the two pieces of information, 2) sellers presented in list are sorted 
by their advertisement intensity, and 3) there is no search effort required to assess the 
relative advertisement expenditure information, however gathering price information 
imposes a search cost (in terms of time and effort), although this is typically lower than in 
the traditional channel.  As a result of these uniqe characteristics, consumer behavior in 
the sponsored search market is likely to differ signif cantly from offline shopping and 
purchase behavior and, therefore, warrants systematic examination.   
Studies suggest that subtle changes in information presentation formats can influence 
information search costs and subsequent consumer choice behavior (Payne, Bettman et 
al. 1993; Hoque and Lohse 1999; Lynch and Ariely 2000; Mandel and Johnson 2002).  
For instance, Hoque and Lohse (1999) conduct an experiment to examine consumer 
behavior in online settings and find that consumers s arch sellers in sequential order and 
therefore suggest that, unlike traditional yellow pages, online yellow pages should charge 
advertisers based on their rank in the advertising list. They recommend that since online 
media exhibit different relationships than print media for some variables, researchers 
should strive to obtain a deeper understanding of consumer information processing and 
decision making processes.  Consistent with this stream of research, I examine the 
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efficacy of different quality signals – primarily, price and advertising intensity - in the 
sponsored search setting and their impacts on consumer behavior and market outcomes.  
3.2.2 Consumer Search and Quality Signaling 
Consumer search behavior has been extensively studied in various disciplines such as 
economics, marketing, psychology, and information systems.  Recognizing the 
importance of understanding consumers’ online search behavior for the design of search 
engines and other information systems, researchers have turned their attention on 
consumer search in online markets (Browne, Pitts et al. 2007).  One important stream of 
consumer search literature relevant to the current study examines consumer search 
behavior in markets that exhibit price dispersion (Stigler 1961).  Analytical models 
(Stigler 1961; Bakos 1997) and empirical evidence (Schotter and Braunstein 1981; 
Ratchford and Srinivasan 1993; Zhang, Fang et al. 2006) suggest that consumers 
searching for a low price adopt a reservation price strategy.  According to this strategy, a 
consumer calculates the reservation price based on the price dispersion and unit search 
cost, and buys from the first seller who meets this reservation price.  However, much of 
the research in this stream either ignores quality dispersion or assumes quality to be 
identifiable prior to purchase.  This study, on the other hand, examines consumer search 
behavior in markets where consumers cannot ascertain qu lity attributes prior to 
purchase.   
It has been argued that markets with information asymmetries break down unless 
there are effective quality-signaling mechanisms.  A signaling mechanism refers to 
informational cues provided by a seller that reveal his/her true quality.  Researchers have 
identified various external cues (i.e., cues not directly related to product performance) – 
such as advertising, warranty, brand name, and product price – that can act as quality 
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signals (Grossman 1981; Milgrom and Roberts 1986).  Of particular interest in the 
current context is the role of advertising expenditure and prices in providing 
informational cues related to quality.  Studies in traditional settings show that consumers 
associate higher advertising expenditure with higher quality (Kirmani and Wright 1989).  
Unlike traditional media, the rank of the advertiser in the sponsored search listings by 
itself provides information about the seller’s advertising expenditure (and possibly the 
seller’s quality) relative to other sellers in the listing.  Since a consumer using a 
sponsored search listing can also choose to search for prices across various sellers, it 
becomes important to understand how consumer’s search behavior may be affected by 
the presence of the advertising signal.   
Finally, in situations characterized by uncertainty such as the sponsored search 
market where consumers do not have ex ante knowledge of quality, evidence suggests 
that risk attitudes play a role in consumers’ reliance on informational signals and their 
search strategies.  A consumer faced with uncertainty bout price and quality acquires 
information that may reduce the risk inherent in such an uncertain environment.  Since 
there is heterogeneity among consumers in risk attitudes, their information acquisition 
strategy also varies.  Prior findings indicate that risk-averse consumers search less than 
risk-neutral consumers in a search with recall scenario (Nachman 1975; Schotter and 
Braunstein 1981).  Surprisingly, research on the rol  of advertising and price signals on 
consumer perceptions overlooks the effects of the risk attitude of consumers.  Given the 
uncertainty faced by consumers in online markets, their risk attitudes are likely to 
strongly influence their reliance on the informational cues available in these markets.  To 
obtain better insights into the relationship between consumer search and consumer’s 
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reliance on signals, I extend this literature and examine the impact of consumers’ risk 
attitude on search behavior and purchase decisions.   
 
3.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
Building upon the theoretical logic and findings reviewed above, Figure 3.2 depicts the 
research model the forms the foundation for this study.  As shown there, I seek to explain 
three key outcomes in the sponsored search context: th  consumers’ search intensity, 
his/her rank preference, and the price premium paid.  I define rank preference as a 
consumer’s propensity to purchase from a seller appe ring higher on the sponsored 
search listing.  The three consumer outcomes are collectively determined by the 
interaction between consumers’ quality beliefs related to advertising and price, and their 
risk attitudes.  I define an advertisement (price) b lief as the consumer’s perception of a 
positive correlation between the seller’s advertising expenditure (price) and quality. Thus, 
a consumer with a higher price belief relies more on the seller’s price as a signal of 
quality as compared with a consumer with a lower price belief.  These beliefs are shaped 
by the availability of quality signals related to advertising and price in the sponsored 
search market.  Specific hypotheses for empirical testing are developed below. 
3.3.1 Advertising and Price as Signals of Quality 
Prior research shows that in offline settings firms’ advertising expenditures can signal 
quality when consumers cannot infer the sellers’ servic /product quality prior to 
purchase.  Experimental studies find that consumers associate higher advertising 
expenditure with higher quality (Kirmani and Wright 1989).  In the sponsored search 
context, sellers are sorted on the basis of their advertising expenditure (i.e., the sellers 
who bid more get listed higher in the search results).  However, as noted earlier, a large 
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proportion of consumers are unaware of how sellers obtain specific ranks in the 
sponsored search market, i.e., they are not aware th t those appearing higher on the list 
have paid more.  To the degree that consumers believe that higher advertising intensity is 
associated with higher quality, awareness of the adv rtisement allocation mechanism 
should enable them to infer the relative quality of the sellers in a sponsored search listing.  
Hence I test,  
H1: In a sponsored search market, consumers who are aware of the ranking mechanism 
will have a stronger advertisement belief than consumers who are unaware of the 
ranking mechanism.  
Researchers suggest that consumers may also use price as an informational cue to 
infer seller quality (Milgrom and Roberts 1986).  A review of empirical studies provides 
evidence for a robust (though moderate) price-quality relationship (Rao 2005) across a 
variety of settings.  I expect this relationship to hold in the online sponsored search 
context as well.  However, while a firm’s prices may serve as a signal of quality, the 
strength of this signal is likely to be attenuated in the presence of additional signals of 
quality (e.g., advertising) (Broniarczyk and Alba 1994).  Thus I expect: 
H2:  In a sponsored search market, consumers who are aware of the ranking mechanism 
will have a weaker price belief than consumers who are unaware of the ranking 
mechanism. 
Earlier studies find that consumers’ beliefs about the price-quality correlation affects 
their search patterns (Roedder, Scott et al. 1986).  Provided that quality dispersion is 
sufficiently high compared to price dispersion (i.e., there is a need to distinguish between 
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sellers), a strong belief in price as a signal of quality leads consumers to search for the 
highest price and pay a high price premium.  Hence I test: 
H3a: In a sponsored search market, the stronger the consumer’s price belief, the higher 
the price premium paid by the consumer. 
While information about a firm’s relative advertising expenditure can be obtained 
from its ranking in the sponsored search results, consumers need to invest a greater effort 
(i.e., visit each seller’s website) to obtain information about the prices charged by 
competing sellers.  Because consumers incur a search cost to obtain price information, 
the benefits of additional search will be realized only in the presence of a strong price 
belief.  That is, consumers who believe that price is a signal of quality will be willing to 
invest the time and effort necessary to locate the sell r with the highest price.  I define 
search intensity as the number of alternative sellers the consumer visits in the online 
market and test:  
H3b: In a sponsored search market, the stronger the consumer’s price belief, the higher 
the consumer’s search intensity. 
Finally, consumers relying on price as a signal of quality will tend to buy from a high 
price seller irrespective of the rank at which the seller appears on the listing.  Thus, under 
the assumption that sellers’ price is uncorrelated with sellers’ rank in the search listing, 
consumers will not systematically attempt to purchase from the top ranked sellers in the 
search listings.  Hence, I posit that:  
H3c: In a sponsored search market, the stronger the consumer’s price belief, the lower 
the consumer’s rank preference.   
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Consumers who are aware of the ranking mechanism and believe in advertising as a 
signal of quality (i.e., they perceive a positive rank-quality correlation) would prefer to 
buy from sellers ranked higher on the list.  Their awareness of the ranking mechanism 
would enable them to infer that sellers higher on the rank have higher advertising 
expenditure.  Therefore I test:   
H4a: In a sponsored search market, for consumers who are aware of the ranking 
mechanism, the stronger the consumer’s advertising belief, the higher the consumer’s 
rank preference.   
Since a consumer with a strong advertising belief would prefer to buy from the 
topmost sellers in the listing, his/her search would be restricted to the few top ranked 
sellers.  It follows that the extent to which this consumer engages in searching for sellers 
will be lower vis-à-vis consumers who have a weaker advertising belief.  I test this 
expectation in the following hypothesis.   
H4b: In a sponsored search market, the stronger the consumer’s advertising belief, the 
lower the consumer’s search intensity. 
Finally, a consumer with a strong advertising belief will attempt to purchase from 
sellers appearing higher on the sponsored list, and is less likely to sample sellers 
appearing lower in the listing.  Due to this constrained sampling, the consumer would not 
always be able to discover high-priced sellers in the market.  As a result, on average, the 
price premium paid by this consumer would be lower.  Thus, I posit:   
H4c: In a sponsored search market, the stronger the consumer’s advertising belief, the 
lower the price premium paid by the consumer. 
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3.3.2 Interaction between Price and Advertising Signals 
Researchers have called for the need to understand the interactions among various signals 
of quality (Kirmani and Rao 2000; Purohit and Srivastava 2001).  This takes on added 
significance in the context of sponsored search as a consumer has access to not only 
relative advertising expenditures, but also the relative prices charged by competing firms.  
In prediction tasks, it has been found that consumers’ r liance on the price signal is 
stronger than their reliance on the advertising signal (Broniarczyk and Alba 1994).  
However, the tradeoff between these two signals has not been studied in the context of a 
purchase task.  Earlier I theorized that a strong price belief influences the price premium 
paid, and a strong advertising belief influences the consumer’s rank preference.  Since a 
consumer would tend to rely on the signal in which he/she has a stronger belief (at the 
expense of other signals) and make a purchase decision onsistent with the stronger 
quality signal, I hypothesize that:  
H5: In a sponsored search market, the stronger the consumer’s advertising belief, the 
weaker the impact of the price belief on the price premium paid by the consumer. 
H6: In a sponsored search market, the stronger the consumer’s price belief, the weaker 
the impact of the advertising belief on the consumer’s rank preference. 
3.3.3 The Effects of Risk Attitudes 
Analytical models developed to derive optimal search strategies as well as signaling 
equilibria generally assume that the searcher is risk neutral.  However, a consumer’s 
optimal strategy may differ if this assumption is violated.  As noted previously, 
researchers examining consumers’ price search behavior in markets with quality 
uncertainty find that risk-averse searchers search less than risk-neutral searchers in a 
search with recall scenario (Nachman 1975).  This is due to the fact that the benefit of 
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additional search is uncertain and hence, risky.  Therefore, a risk-averse consumer would 
be satisfied with the current alternative even if theexpected marginal benefit of searching 
for the next alternative is larger than the marginal se rch cost7.  I test this expectation in 
the following hypothesis:  
H7a: In a sponsored search market, risk-averse consumers will have lower search 
intensity than risk seeking consumers. 
Although reliance on quality signals is unavoidable in markets with quality 
uncertainty, because the signal may not always be perf ctly correlated with quality, risk-
averse consumers are likely to prefer an information l cue which minimizes any potential 
loss.  In situations where either price or advertising may signal quality, acting on the 
basis of a price signal can lead to larger loss than acting on the basis of an advertising 
signal, as in the former case, the consumer might end up paying a price premium for a 
low quality product.  In other words, relying on a false advertising signal is less 
detrimental than relying on a false price signal.  Therefore, a risk-averse consumer would 
prefer to use the advertising signal whereas a risk-seeking consumer would prefer to act 
on the price signal.  Recall that reliance on the price signal results in a higher price 
premium while reliance on the advertisement signal yields a higher rank preference.  I 
test the following hypotheses related to these effects:  
H7b: In a sponsored search market, risk-averse consumers will pay a lower price 
premium as compared to risk-seeking consumers.  This effect will be stronger for 
consumers with advertising beliefs.  
                                               
7 In an experimental study, Schotter and Braunstein (1981) found support for this analytical proposition.   
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H7c: In a sponsored search market, risk-seeking consumers will have a lower rank 
preference as compared to risk-averse consumers.  This effect will be stronger for 
consumers with price beliefs. 
 In summary, I drew from and extended research on quality uncertainty and signaling 
and consumer information search to propose hypotheses related to consumer outcomes in 
a sponsored search setting.  Two key theoretical extensions to existing work embedded in 
the proposed model are first, the explicit incorporati n of risk attitudes, and second, 
predictions about the relative efficacy of price and advertisement signals on consumer 
outcomes in the new context of online sponsored search.  The experiment conducted to 
test the research hypotheses is described next. 
 
3.4 METHODOLOGY  
The dominant empirical strategy in prior research on quality signaling and consumer 
search behavior is that of an experiment as it is viewed as the most appropriate method 
for achieving a precise test of theory (Schotter and Braunstein 1981; Lynch and Ariely 
2000; Srivastava and Lurie 2001; Zwick, Rapoport et al. 2003).  Following this tradition, 
I employ an experimental methodology to test the res arch hypotheses.   
3.4.1 Research Design 
The experiment employs a one factor (knowledge of sp n ored search mechanism) 
between-subjects factorial design where one group of subjects is informed that sellers are 
ranked in descending order on the sponsored search listing according to how much they 
pay per click (treatment group), and the other group f subjects is informed that all sellers 
in the market are randomly assigned a rank in the directory listing (control group).  The 
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subjects are presented one set of general instructions and a set of specific instructions for 
their assigned experimental condition (See Appendix B1 for details).  
The control group has 38 subjects, each of whom is informed that sellers are ordered 
randomly in the listing, while the treatment group consists of 42 subjects8, each of whom 
is informed that sellers are ordered in the listing based on their relative advertising 
expenditures.  As is common in such experimental setings, undergraduate students in a 
large northeastern business school were recruited for this experiment.  The subjects 
participate for course credits.  In addition they are provided performance-based monetary 
incentives. 
The experiment consists of three tasks: (1) A shopping task in which subjects make 
search and purchase decisions (See Appendix B2), and (2) A follow-up survey (see 
Appendix B3) in which subjects are asked questions about their beliefs about price and 
advertising as signals of quality.  (3) A lottery selection task (see Appendix B4) to assess 
risk attitudes (Holt and Laury 2002).   
Shopping Task: The shopping task requires subjects to conduct 10 shopping trips 
using a simulated online yellow pages directory.  In each shopping trip, subjects query 
the directory for a particular product.  The online directory presents a list of 10 sellers 
(identified by fictitious names) along with a link to visit their websites, in a rank-ordered 
listing.  The information provided to consumers about the ordering of the sellers in the 
directory listing differs across different experimental treatments.  The subjects are also 
informed about the price dispersion and the quality dispersion among sellers in each 
market.  The quality dispersion (i.e., range of seller quality in a market) is four times the 
                                               
8 Originally there were 43 subjects. However, one subject who did not complete the experiment was 
dropped.   
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price dispersion (i.e., range of prices in a market)9.  Subjects can observe the price being 
charged by a seller but they have to incur a specified search cost to visit a seller’s website 
and obtain the price being charged by that seller.  The search cost at any point in time in a 
shopping trip is displayed on the top panel of the computer screen.  Information about 
seller quality is not revealed to the subjects in any treatment at any time during the 
experiment.  Subjects can, however, use advertising and/or price informational cues to 
infer a seller’s quality.  Subjects are asked to maxi ize their payoffs by buying from the 
highest quality seller at the lowest price while mini izing the total search cost.   
The payoff function given to subjects is to maximize U = Q – P – n*c , where “Q” is 
the quality of the product purchased, “P” is the price paid for the purchased product, “c” 
is the cost to discover a seller’s price and “n” is the total number of sellers searched.  This 
utility function is similar to that used by Diehl, Kornish et al. (2003), except that it 
explicitly includes search cost in the specification.  Price, seller quality, and search cost 
are all expressed in experimental dollars.  The subjects are provided monetary incentives 
based on their performance in maximizing their payoff function (i.e., utility derived from 
the purchase). 
Lottery Selection Task: I use a standard lottery selection task to assess th  risk 
attitude of the subjects that requires them to make 10 decisions regarding lottery 
preferences.  The ten lottery decisions are designed to valuate choices between risky 
prospects when the probability of the higher payoff is varied in a systematic manner.  
Each decision involves choosing between a pair of lotteries referred to as option “A” and 
option “B”.  The subject is shown the payoff and the winning probability associated with 
                                               
9 The rationale for higher quality dispersion is to ensure that the quality attribute - the key outcome f 
interest - is salient in the decision making process.  
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each lottery, and has to choose one of these lotteries to play.  The subject is told to make 
each decision carefully as one of these decisions will be randomly selected to calculate 
subject’s payoff.  After the subject has submitted the 10 lottery decisions, one of the 
decisions is chosen randomly as the outcome.  This lottery selection task is performed 
twice.  In the second round, the procedure remains the ame, except for the payoffs, 
which are incremented at a higher rate. 
3.4.2 Measurement and Data 
Knowledge of the sponsored search advertising mechanism is included as a dummy 
variable that is used to identify those subjects who have different sets of information.  As 
noted earlier, this variable is manipulated by providing information about the existence of 
sponsored search advertising mechanism to the subjects in the treatment groups before 
they make search and purchase decisions.  Subjects in the control group, on the other 
hand, are informed that the ordering of sellers in the listing is random.   
After completing the shopping task, subjects report their beliefs about the correlation 
between sellers’ price and sellers’ quality as well as sellers’ rank on the listing and 
sellers’ quality.  Since the relative advertising exp nditures of sellers are determined by 
their rank in the sponsored search listing (in the treatment sample), I use the term rank-
quality as being synonymous with advertising-quality.  Quality beliefs are 
operationalized using self reported measures, the items for which are adapted from 
existing literature (Kirmani and Wright 1989; Kirmani 1997).  I used a 7-point Likert 
scale for assessing the strength of the advertising and price beliefs where 7 represents 
“strongly agree that there is a positive correlation” and 1 represent “strongly disagree that 
there is a positive correlation”.  A composite of 3 items is used to create advertisement 
belief scale – HRHQ (cronbach’s alpha=0.85) and a composite of 2 items is used to 
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create price belief scale – HPHQ (cronbach’s alpha=0.78).  I conducted a factor analysis 
to assess the convergent and divergent validity of he scales.  The results suggest that 
HRHQ and HRPQ are two distinct constructs.  The items and factor analysis results are 
presented in Appendix B3.    
The dependent variables -- search intensity, price premium, and rank preference – are 
calculated based on observed behavior, and are recorded using click-stream data.  Search 
intensity (SearchIntensity) is measured as the total number of sellers visited by a subject 
in a given shopping trip.  Price premium (PricePremium) is the difference between the 
price at which the subject purchased the product during a shopping trip and the lowest 
price in that market.  Rank preference (RankPreference) is the rank of the seller from 
whom the subject made the purchase.  It is reverse cod d where 1 represents the highest 
rank (i.e., top rank on the list), and 10 represent lowest rank (i.e., the bottom rank on the 
list).  Thus, a lower value of RankPreference reflects a higher rank preference, i.e., 
indicating an inclination towards selecting a seller located higher in the listing.   
As described above, the risk attitude of subjects is assessed using the lottery selection 
task.  Each lottery involves a choice between a high-risk and a low-risk (“safe”) option.  
The number of safe choices (captured in the variable Safe) reflects the risk aversion of a 
subject.  Subjects who make 10 safe choices out of 10 decisions are considered to be 
extremely risk averse while subject who did not make ny safe choices are risk-seekers 
(Holt and Laury 2002). 
3.5 RESULTS 
3.5.1 Manipulation Check 
Recall that the key manipulation in the experiment is to provide information about the 
relative advertising expenditures of participating firms to the treatment group but not to 
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the control group.  In the follow-up survey, subjects are asked two questions about the 
ranking of the sellers in the listing to test whether the treatment manipulation was 
successful or not.  These two questions are “in your opinion, did the seller on the third 
rank incur a higher advertising cost than the seller on the fourth rank on the list” and “in 
your opinion, did the seller on the first rank incur the highest adverting cost than the rest 
of the sellers on the list”.  Subjects responded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  I create an “AdvertisingExpenditure” variable 
using these two items (cronbach’s alpha=.91) and couct a t- test to examine if the two 
groups differ in terms of their knowledge about firms’ relative advertising expenditures.  
I find that subjects’ beliefs about the seller ordering differs significantly.  The mean score 
for the treatment group is 5.93 whereas the mean score for the control group is 3.54 
(p<0.001), indicating that subjects in both the groups read and understood the instructions 
and the manipulation was successful.   
Descriptive statistics shown in Table 3.1 suggest that as expected, subjects in the 
treatment group have a higher advertisement belief than subjects in the control group but 
the two groups are similar in terms of price beliefs.  Interestingly, though the rank of the 
seller from whom the subjects purchase is not significantly different across the control 
and treatment groups, subjects in the treatment group pay a lower price premium than do 
control group subjects.  I also find that, as desired, subjects in the two groups do not 
differ in terms of the risk attitude due to the random assignment procedure.  
Variable correlations are shown in Table 3.2.  The correlation coefficients suggest 
that the subjects in the treatment group have a stronger advertising belief and pay a lower 
price premium than those in the control group.  Further, I find that subjects with price 
66 
beliefs pay a higher price premium.  Subjects with strong advertising beliefs, on the other 
hand, pay a lower price premium and have a higher rank preference (i.e., more likely to 
purchase from sellers appearing on top of the listing).  Interestingly, I also find that the 
price premium and the rank preference are positively correlated suggesting that subjects 
who have a rank preference also pay a high price premium.   
3.5.2 Empirical Analyses 
I hypothesized that awareness of the sponsored search allocation mechanisms will lead 
consumers to believe that sellers higher on the listing are of higher quality.  A 
comparison of the distributions of seller quality beliefs held by subjects in the control and 
treatment group provides support for the hypothesis, H1.  The results show that the 
advertisement belief (HRHQ) for the treatment group is significantly stronger than that 
for the control group.  The mean score for the treatm nt group is greater than 4 
(mean=4.60, p<0.01) which is the midpoint of the Likert scale, suggesting a neutral 
belief.  On the other hand, the mean score for the control group is significantly lower than 
4 (mean=2.44, p<0.01), indicating that subjects in the control group do not believe that 
seller rank and seller quality are related.   
With respect to price beliefs, I find that subjects in both the groups have a high mean 
score on the scale measuring the perceived relationship between seller price and quality 
(HPHQ).  The mean is 4.97 and 4.90 for control and treatment group, respectively.  I 
compare the mean price belief scores across the two groups to test if the presence of the 
advertising signal lowers subjects’ belief in the price signal.  T-test results suggest that 
the strength of price belief does not differ across groups (p=0.81); hence I reject 
hypothesis H2.   
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Before examining specific hypotheses regarding impact of quality beliefs on 
consumer behavior, I take a closer look at differences in the shopping behavior of the 
subjects in the treatment and the control group.  The distribution of the dependent 
variables is shown in Table 3.3.  There is no difference in search intensities across the 
treatment and the control group.  Approximately 50% of the subjects in both groups visit 
only two or three sellers.  The distribution of theprice premium paid shows that subjects 
in the treatment group pay a much smaller price premium as compared to the subjects in 
control group at every percentile.  The distribution of the rank of the sellers from whom 
subjects bought the product shows that subjects in the treatment group buy from sellers 
higher on the listing (i.e., had a higher rank prefe nce) as compared to subjects in the 
control group in every percentile, except 75th and 99th percentile.  However the difference 
between ranks is small.   
To statistically validate the differences in the subjects’ behavior across the control 
and treatment groups, I conduct a MANOVA with SearchIntensity, PricePremium, and 
RankPreference, as the dependent variables, and the treatment dummy as the independent 
variable.  Though the subjects in the treatment group (i.e., subject who are aware of 
advertising mechanism) pay a lower price premium than those in the control group (mean 
difference=10 units) and the subjects in the treatmn  group buy from sellers higher on 
the list compared to those in the control group (mean difference=0.4 unit), the difference 
between the groups is not significant (Wilks' lambda=0.93; p=0.13).  However, the lack 
of any significant differences in the behaviors of the two groups could stem from the 
aggregation of subjects with one of the four different beliefs about quality – belief in 
neither signal, only advertising beliefs, only price belief, or beliefs in both advertising 
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and price signals.  Therefore, I examine the subjects’ behavior after taking into account 
their quality signal beliefs as proposed in the research model (see Figure 3.2).   
The hypotheses related to consumer search and purchase behavior are tested using 
a set of three regression equations as specified below: 
SearchIntensity i = α1 + α2* HRHQi + α3* HPHQi + α4* Safei + α5* 
HRHQi*HPHQi + α6* HRHQi* Safei + α7* HPHQi* Safei + α8* HRHQi*HPHQi* 
Safei + ei                         (4) 
PricePremiumi = β1 + β2* HRHQi + β3* HPHQi + β4* Safei + β5* HRHQi*HPHQi 
+ β6* HRHQi* Safei + β7* HPHQi* Safei + β8* HRHQi*HPHQi* Safei + ei                          
(5) 
RankPreferencei = γ1 + γ2* HRHQi + γ3* HPHQi + γ4* Safei + γ5* 
HRHQi*HPHQi + γ6* HRHQi* Safei + γ7* HPHQi* Safei + γ8* HRHQi*HPHQi* 
Safei + ei                           (6) 
where i stands for the subject.   
 
Because the dependent variables in these three equations re generated as the result of 
a subject’s action, the error terms may be correlated cross the equations.  I conduct a 
Breusch-Pagan test and find that the error terms are correlated (Chi-Sq[3] =  22.189, 
p<0.01).  Therefore, to account for correlated error terms, I use a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) model10.  Because the independent variables across the equations do 
not change, the regression coefficients in the SUR model will be the same as ordinary 
least square (OLS) model, however, the SUR model will be more efficient as the error 
terms are correlated.  The results of SUR analysis are presented in Table 3.4.  I first test a 
model without risk attitude (i.e., Model A) and then introduce risk attitude and the 
corresponding interactions in the next model (i.e., Model B).  The coefficients of quality 
signals are similar across the two models. 
                                               
10 I also conducted multivariate regression and the results are consistent with SUR analysis.  
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The SUR results indicate that subjects with varying types and levels of quality signal 
beliefs do not differ in terms of their search intensity.  Thus I do not find support for 
hypotheses H3b and H4b.  Further, I find that the subjects’ risk attitude does not affect 
their search intensity (results are in the expected direction but not significant) leading to 
the rejection of hypothesis H7a.   
In examining how the price premium that subjects’ pay depends on their beliefs in 
price and advertising as signals of quality, I find that subjects with a stronger price belief 
pay a larger price premium.  A unit increase (from the mean levels) in the strength of the 
price belief leads to an increase of 4.98 units in the price premium paid by subjects.  On 
the other hand, subjects who believe in a positive advertising-quality correlation pay a 
lower price premium.  A unit increase (from the mean levels) in the strength of the 
advertisement belief decreases the price premium paid by 4.20 units.  These results 
provide support for hypotheses H3a and H4c.   
In examining the effect of interaction between price beliefs and advertising beliefs on 
price premium I find that the interactions are not significant, suggesting the lack of any 
moderating effects of the advertisement belief on the relationship between the price belief 
and the price premium paid.  While the risk attitudes of the subjects do not directly 
impact their price or rank premium, I find some evidence of a higher level interaction 
between price beliefs, advertisement beliefs, and the risk attitude of subjects (β=-0.78; 
p=0.09).  This suggests that the risk attitude of the subjects moderates the impact of the 
price and advertising beliefs on the outcomes.  Thethree-way interaction graphs are 
presented in Figure 3.3. 
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Panel A and Panel B graph the interaction between th  price belief and the 
advertising-belief for subjects with different risk attitudes.  It is clear that the price belief 
leads to higher price premium whereas the advertisement belief lowers the price 
premium.  As seen in Panel A which represents risk-averse subjects, the impact of the 
price belief on price premium is significantly weakr for those risk-averse subjects who 
believe in a positive correlation between advertising expenditure and quality.  Panel B 
presents the interaction graph for risk-seekers.  The graph suggests that risk-seekers who 
have a stronger advertisement belief but not price belief, pay a lower price premium.  
However, risk-seekers who have a stronger price beli f pay a similar price premium 
irrespective of their belief in the advertising-quality signal.  Thus, I find qualified support 
for hypothesis H5 (i.e., the advertisement belief moderates the relationship between price 
beliefs and price premium); however, the strength of t e moderation is determined by the 
risk attitude of the subject.   
Panel C and D present an alternative representation of three way interaction by 
plotting the graph between price beliefs and the risk attitude for subjects with differing 
levels of advertisement beliefs.  The results show that the price beliefs lead to a higher 
price premium and the advertising-quality signal lowers the price premium.  Further, I 
find that, in the absence of advertisement beliefs, risk-averse subjects are more likely to 
act on the price signal and pay a higher price premium than risk seeking subjects.  
However, in the presence of strong advertisement beliefs, risk averse subjects switch to 
an advertising signal and pay a lower price premium than risk seekers (irrespective of 
their price beliefs).  Thus I find qualified support for Hypothesis 7b (i.e., risk-averse 
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consumers will pay a lower price premium as compared to risk-seeking consumers in the 
presence of an advertisement belief).  
The result of the rank preference regression shows that subjects with a stronger belief 
in the advertising-quality signal tend to buy from sellers higher on the list, supporting 
hypothesis H4a.  The main effect of price beliefs on rank preference as well as the 
interaction effect is not significant.  Thus, I do n t find support for hypothesis H3c (i.e., 
price belief lowers the rank preference), hypothesis H6 (i.e., price belief weakens the 
effect of the advertisement belief on rank preference) and H7c (i.e., risk seeking 
consumers have a lower rank preference than risk averse consumers).   
3.6 DISCUSSION 
This research was motivated by the observation that online search has become a 
consequential activity for consumers using electronic markets.  As a result, sellers are 
increasingly relying on new and emerging mechanisms uch as sponsored search 
advertising to reach these consumers.  The sponsored earch context creates a unique 
informational environment that is characterized by a number of features including 
significant information asymmetry, directionality, readily available comparative 
information about advertising expenditure, and price information for which consumers 
incur a search cost.  I sought to understand how consumer search and purchase processes 
unfold in this emerging context. 
Empirical results suggest that awareness of the sponsored search allocation 
mechanism (i.e., firms ranked higher incur higher advertising expenditure) has the 
potential to influence consumers’ online shopping behavior.  While this awareness does 
not change the consumer’s search intensity (i.e., ov rall click-through rates), the click-
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through as well as conversion rates increase at higher listing ranks.  Consumers who have 
information about the sponsored search allocation mechanism use the rank of the firms as 
a proxy of relative advertising intensity of the firms, and form beliefs about advertising as 
a signal of quality.  Their beliefs are reflected in their search and purchase behavior.  In 
addition to the advertising signal, consumers also use price as a signal of quality.   
Price versus Advertising as Signals of Quality 
I find interesting dynamics between advertising and price as signals of quality in the 
sponsored search context.  The results show that consumers who have knowledge of the 
allocation mechanism of the sponsored search results be ieve that firms appearing higher 
on the listings are of higher quality (i.e., they exhibit a strong advertisement belief) and 
therefore, behave differently than those who are unaware of the rank allocation 
mechanism.  Specifically, I find that consumers who have a stronger belief in price as a 
signal of quality pay a higher price premium and consumers who have a stronger belief in 
advertising as a signal of quality have a higher rank preference (i.e., are more likely to 
buy from firms appearing on the top).  However, a belief in advertising as a signal of 
quality weakens the price signal, and leads a consumer to pay a lower price premium.  A 
belief in price as a signal of quality, on the other and, does not influence the rank 
preference.  This finding is contrary to extant research which suggest that price signals 
strongly dominate advertising signals (Broniarczyk and Alba 1994).  The striking 
difference can be attributed to the unique characteistic of the sponsored search 
advertising medium which informs consumers about the relative advertising 
intensity/expenditure of all the firms within the market.   
Risk Aversion and Reliance on Signals   
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The results also highlight the importance of understanding consumers’ attitudes towards 
risk in order to explain their reliance on price and advertising signals.  I argued that risk 
seeking and risk-averse subjects are likely to adopt ifferent strategies when they hold 
different beliefs about price and advertisement signals.  As expected, I find that risk-
averse subjects differ from risk seekers in terms of their reliance on signals.  However, 
contrary to expectations, I find that among those consumers who do not have advertising 
signal beliefs, risk-averse consumers pay a higher price premium than risk seekers.  
Interestingly, the price premium paid by risk-averse consumers is significantly lower than 
risk seeking consumers in the presence of an advertisement belief.  Thus, the results 
indicate that while risk-averse consumers are more likely to rely on signals under 
uncertainty, given a choice of signals they prefer signals that are less risky.  
Prior to discussing its implications, I acknowledge th  limitations of the study.  
First, the use of student subjects may weaken the external validity of the findings.  
However, this should not be a serious concern as studen s routinely make purchase 
decisions therefore should have formed their beliefs about signals based on their 
experiences, like any other consumer.  Even if the indings may not be generalized to 
larger population, the results should hold for an important demographic -- students.  
Second, to tease out the marginal effects of the two competing quality signals, I focused 
on market situations where price and advertising are uncorrelated.  However, it is 
possible than some markets exhibit a positive or negative correlation between price and 
advertising.  It is not clear whether these findings will be applicable to those market 
situations.  For example, it is possible that positive correlation between price and 
advertising may strengthen consumers’ belief in both the quality signals.  Thus, the 
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congruent signals may lead to high price premium as well as higher rank preference.  On 
the other hand, negative correlation between price and quality may weaken consumers’ 
beliefs in signals, and the incongruent signals mayeither make consumer disregard any 
signal or rely on the stronger signal.  Therefore, it would be interesting to extend this 
study by examining consumer behavior in the present of congruent versus incongruent 
signals. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
Overall, the results of this study have significant implications for the sellers using 
sponsored search listings, as well as for online intermediaries managing sponsored search 
auction markets.  It appears that though the overall click through rate might not change as 
more consumers become aware of the sponsored search mechanism, the click through 
and conversion rate at higher ranks may increase. Consumers may buy from a seller on a 
higher rank regardless of whether the price is higher or lower than other sellers.  Thus, 
sellers need to take into account both the pricing as well as the advertising strategies to 
maximize their profits.  Online intermediaries, on the other hand, need to ensure that their 
advertisement allocation mechanism remains consistet with the consumer’s 
advertisement belief.  Otherwise, in the long-run co sumers may avoid clicking and 
buying at the top ranks, thus leading to the collapse of the auction mechanism to allocate 
the advertisement ranks.   
Search intermediaries such as Yahoo! and Google are constantly experimenting with 
various rank allocation mechanisms -- such as “pay per click”, “pay per action” or 
willingness to “pay per impression” (Lee 2002; Newcomb 2005), with the objective of 
getting the advertisers to reveal their true valuation for appearing on higher ranks in the 
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search listings.  The findings suggest that search intermediaries as well as researchers 
developing analytical models to compare different ra k allocation mechanisms should 
also take into account the possibility that information about the allocation mechanism 
may itself affect consumers’ behavior which in turn may influence sellers’ valuations and 
ultimately search intermediaries profits.   
The results also underscore the fact that consumer behavior in online markets is 
significantly different than that in traditional markets due to the unique informational 
environments created by the online medium.  The findings provide further evidence that 
subtle changes in the online format and presentatio of information and/or the amount of 
information consumers have about the online market mechanisms, such as sponsored 
search advertising, may have significant consequences on consumers’ perceptions and 
attitudes.  These beliefs and perceptions in turn will dictate consumers’ interactions with 
the online markets and information systems and their onl ne behavior.  An understanding 
of the factors that may affect consumers behavior is important, especially in the context 
of sponsored search advertising, because consumer search and purchase strategy – 
manifested in the click-through and conversion rateat various ranks in the sponsored 
search listing significantly affects the revenues and strategies of advertising 
intermediaries and the advertisers in this multi-bil on emerging industry.  Consumer 
welfare is also affected as a result of the interaction of sellers advertising strategies and 
consumer search strategies, which has implications for policy makers.   
As noted earlier, a large proportion of consumers are unaware that the sponsored 
search listing are generated as a result of auction outcomes where advertisers bid against 
each other to get better placement.  Based on the findings, I believe that making 
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consumers aware of the allocation mechanism may help t  search engines and 
advertising intermediaries.  The advertisement beliefs of consumers may increase the 
conversion rates at top ranks, thereby increasing the competition in the sponsored search 
auctions for the top slots in the listing, and a consequent increase in the monetization of 
the online real estate.  Future studies should also examine how different interface design 
and provision of additional information about seller quality and price in the listing may 
affect consumer search and purchase behavior.  This study focused on the “pay per click” 
mechanism.  Future work should extend this study an compare consumers’ advertising-
quality belief across different allocation mechanisms and to examine its impact on search 
intermediary profits, advertiser profits and consumer welfare.   
This study makes several important contributions.  It is among the first to examine 
whether knowledge of the sponsored search advertising mechanism affects consumer 
perceptions about the quality of sellers, and their subsequent purchase behavior.  It is also 
among the very few that examines the interactions among different informational 
cues/signals on consumer behavior.  Further, in contrast to extant research investigating 
the role of adverting as a signal of quality, this study measures the effect of advertising 
expenditure not only on perceived quality, but also on observed behavioral outcomes 
such as search intensity, price sensitivity and consumers’ purchase decisions.  Finally, to 
the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to examine the influence of consumers’ 
risk attitudes on their use of informational cues. 
77 
CHAPTER 4: PRICE, QUALITY AND ADVERTISING RELATIONS HIP IN 




Though there is extensive literature examining the relationships between price, quality 
and advertising in the traditional market, it is not clear how the unique characteristics of 
online directional advertising medium, such as comparison shopping, may affect these 
relationships.  Given the lack of research in this field, I empirically examine the 
relationship between advertising intensity of the advertisers and their price and quality 
attributes in online directional markets. Interestingly, I find that unlike majority of the 
traditional results, higher quality firms and lower priced firms are more likely to have 
higher advertising intensity.  I attribute these results to the tradeoff between a firm’s 
conversion rate and its profit margin and the counteracting effect of price and quality on 





Comparison shopping engines provide a platform to the firms to advertise and reach the 
consumers who are actively searching for a specific product.  However, unlike traditional 
advertising, comparison shopping advertising not only informs consumers about price 
and quality but also directs consumers’ search (Arbatskaya Forthcoming).  While there is 
extensive literature examining the relationships betwe n price, quality and advertising in 
the traditional market, it is not clear how the unique characteristics of online directional 
advertising medium, such as comparison shopping, may affect these relationships.  It is 
important to understand firms’ strategies and market outcomes in directional markets as 
advertising directs consumer search which would have a significant impact on consumer 
welfare, profitability of the firms in the market and the profitability of the advertising 
platform provider.  Given the lack of research in this field, I empirically examine the 
relationship between advertising intensity of the advertisers and their price and quality 
attributes in online directional markets. Interestingly, I find that unlike majority of the 
traditional results, higher quality firms and lower priced firms are more likely to have 
higher advertising intensity.   
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 4.2 presents a brief 
overview of the research on advertising, price and quality in traditional and online 
markets.  Section 4.3 formulates the economic model for the advertising decision of a 
firm in the comparison shopping context.  The research methodology is described in 
section 4.4, followed by results in section 4.5.  Section 4.6 provides a discussion of the 
findings and their implications, and Section 4.7 concludes the chapter. 
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4.2 RELEVANT LITERATURE 
While there is a large amount of research examining online consumer behavior 
(Jarvenpaa, Tractinsky et al. 2000; Koufaris 2002; Gefen, Karahanna et al. 2003; Pavlou 
2003) and impact of online advertising on consumer behavior (Gao, Koufaris et al. 2004; 
Hong, Thong et al. 2004; Wu, Cook Jr. et al. 2005), there is limited research that 
investigates the online advertising strategies of firms.  In this study, I examine the affect 
of the price and quality of a firm’s product/service on its advertising intensity in online 
markets.  Specifically, I focus on directional markets created by online intermediaries 
such as search engines and comparison shopping engines.   
As mentioned earlier, online directional markets provide an ordered listing of 
firms selling a specific product and consumers generally search the listing sequentially 
from top to bottom.  Researchers suggest that strategies employed by the firms and the 
resulting competition dynamics in such directional m rkets may be different from those 
in the traditional media (Perry and Wigderson 1986; Arbatskaya forthcoming).  For 
instance, Arbatskaya (Forthcoming) suggests that these markets would exhibit positive 
correlation between advertising expenditure and price (i.e., firms paying more to appear 
higher on the listing will charge higher price).  However, this proposition has not been 
tested empirically.  To the best of my knowledge, th re is no study that examines the 
relationship between quality and price and/or quality nd advertising in online directional 
markets, with the notable exception of Animesh et al. (2006) and Edelman (2006).  I 
extend this stream of research by empirically examining the relationship between price 
and quality, and price and advertising in a comparison shopping market.   
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Economists have employed analytical models to examine the relationship between 
price, quality and advertising decisions of a firm n traditional markets.  However, the 
results are inconclusive.  Nelson (1974) argued that lower price and higher quality 
products are more likely to advertise. Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) also suggest that 
higher quality firms will advertise more, given tha the cost difference between low and 
high quality firms is sufficiently low.  On the other hand, Schmalensee (1978) argues that 
lower quality firms may advertise more, especially if consumers are responsive to 
advertising.  Comanor and Wilson (1979) also suggest that high priced and low quality 
products are more likely to be advertised.  There is another stream of research  which 
claims that higher quality firms (Orzach, Overgaard et al. 2002) and higher priced firms 
(Bagwell and Overgaard 2005) will have modest advertising expenditure (i.e., neither too 
low not too high) or may even have lower advertising levels (Zhao 2000).  
Given the conflicting results in the theoretical literature, Archibald et al. (1983) 
suggest that “the relationship between advertising a d quality is an empirical question”.  
Interestingly, empirical research investigating the relationships between the three 
important variables – price, quality and advertising i  traditional markets is also 
inconclusive (Oxenfeldt 1950; Wills and Mueller 1989; Caves and Greene 1996; Nichols 
1998; Thomas, Shane et al. 1998).  One stream of empirical studies examines the impact 
of advertising on the price and/or quality across markets with different advertising 
regimes.  Benham (1972) compared the eyeglasses market in different American states 
and found that prices were lower in states where adv rtising was allowed.  Kwoka (1984) 
examined optometry market and observed that when firms are allowed to advertise, firms 
that advertise lower their price and their quality whereas the non-advertisers increase 
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their quality.  Other stream of empirical research focuses on the differences across firms 
in terms of their advertising, pricing, and quality.  Thomas et al. (1998) examined firm’s 
advertising intensity as a function of unobserved quality and price11.  They found that, in 
automobile market where product quality cannot be completely determined until after 
purchase, higher price products and higher quality products will have higher advertising 
levels.  Archibald et al. (1983) also show that both price and quality are positively 
correlated to advertising expenditure.  Caves and Greene (1996), on the other hand, 
conclude that advertising and quality are unrelated cross brand in the 200 product 
categories that they studied.  It is important to note here that this stream of research has 
primarily relied on the signaling role of advertising to understand the relationship 
between price, quality and advertising.   I extend this stream of research in the domain of 
online directional markets where the main role of advertising is to direct consumer search 
in addition to providing information about price and quality.   
The model that I employ is closest to the one developed by Tellis et al. (1988).  
They propose a set of equations predicting relative advertising, market share, relative 
cost, and profit of a firm.  In the equation predicting relative advertising they model 
advertising as a linear function of relative price and relative quality (where both variables 
are exogenous variables), in addition to other variables.  Their results suggest that higher 
quality products have higher advertising intensity. 
                                               
11 However, they do not include both price and quality in the same model. 
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4.3 THE MODEL 
I develop a simple model to understand the relationship between price, quality and 
advertising intensity in online directional markets.  The profit function for the firm 
participating in a comparison shopping advertising market can be written as:  
)],,([)],,(),(),([),,( AqpXAAqpXqpRqpVAqp ∗−∗∗=π  
where V is the profit margin per unit, A is the unit cost of attracting a consumer to the 
firm’s store, X is the number of consumers who visit the firm’s store (i.e., click-through 
rate), R is the probability that a visitor will actually purchase (i.e., conversion rate), p and 
q are the price and quality of the product/service, respectively. 
I assume that a firm’s quality is exogenously determined.  A consumer in the 
market cannot observe the real quality of the firms with certainty.  Therefore, following 
the tourist-native logic (Salop and Stiglitz 1977; Baylis and Perloff 2002), firms may 
charge different prices which may not necessarily be a function of their real quality (i.e., 
some firms are good and some are bad).  Given the quality and price, a firm can choose to 
influence the demand by advertising to maximize its profits.  Assuming this to be so, the 
optimal advertising (A*) be derived as: 







AqpX AAqpXqpRqpV    (1) 
A∗ = Vp,q ∗ Rp,q − Xp,q,A∂Xp,q,A
∂A       (2) 
I chose the following specifications for profit margin per unit, click-through and 
conversion rate functions.  Profit margin per unit (V) is expected to increase with P but 
decrease with increasing Q as specified below:   
V = expγ0 + γ1p − γ2q         (3)  
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It has been observed that the number of potential customer visits to a firm’s 
website is an exponential function of the rank of afirm on the listing (Animesh, 
Viswanathan et al. 2007).  Now, we know that by increasing the per unit advertising bid 
(i.e., cost per click) a firm can obtain higher rank i  the comparison shopping market by 
outbidding other firms in the online auction.  Thus I model X (clickthrough rate or 
potential demand) as an increasing function of A (advertising expenditure).  Further, the 
number of visits received by a firm (i.e., potential consumers/demand) is also expected to 
vary as a function of price (P) and quality (Q) of the firm’s product/service.  I assume that 
X will be an increasing function of Q and a decreasing function of P.  This specification 
is similar to that of Cowling and Cubbin (1971).   
X = expβ0 − β1p + β2qAβ3       (4) 
The specification for R (conversion rate) is similar to X.  However, I do not 
model conversion rate to vary as a function of A.  
R = expα0 − α1p + α2q        (5) 
Though the particular functional form is chosen primarily for analytical and 
empirical tractability, the specifications model the essence of the relationship between 
variables.  The reason for assuming these specific functional forms is to transform the 
model to a version that is linear in the parameters of interest and thus facilitate empirical 
estimation.  The impact of P and Q on V and R is depict d in Figure 4.1. 

















i.e.  =*A    +0θ    θ1p +    θ2q       (6) 
where θ0 = γ0 + α0;θ1 = γ1 − α1;θ2 = α2 − γ2   
I use equation (6) as the basis of the econometric model.  If 01 >θ  then one can infer 
that γ1 > α1  (i.e., the positive effect of higher price on per unit margin is larger than the 
negative impact of higher price on R or in other words, loss of conversion efficiency is 
compensated by larger profit margin per unit).  If  θ2 > 0 then one can infer that 
α2 > γ2  (i.e., the positive effect of higher quality on R is larger than the negative impact 
of higher quality on the cost of production). 
Further, it is possible that price and quality attributes of a firm may interact to 
determine the firm’s advertising intensity.  Given the two dimensions -- price and quality, 
we can construct a 2X2 matrix to understand the tradeoff between conversion rate and 
profit margin due to varying price and quality attributes of a firm (refer Table 4.1).  The 
firms having lowest price and highest quality product/service would be the best deal for 
the consumers and I refer to them as “cherries”. These firms would have lowest profit 
margin (as per equation 3) but highest conversion rate (as per equation 5).  On the other 
extreme are the firms having highest price and lowest quality and I term them as 
“lemons” as these firms offer the worst deal to the consumers. These firms would have 
highest profit margin (as per equation 3) but lowest conversion rate (as per equation 5).  
The other 2 types of firms which either have high price and high quality or have low 
price and low quality can be considered as offering “fair deal” and their profit margin and 
conversion rate would lie somewhere between the two extremes of “cherries” and 
“lemons”.  To examine which of these four types of firms are most likely to advertise, we 
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can modify the model shown in equation 6 by including an interaction term between price 
and quality.      
      =A    +0β    +p1β    q2β   + pq3β     (7) 
Based on the profit margin and conversion rate tradeoff that drives the advertising 
intensity, I expect that either the cherries or the lemons will have the highest advertising 
intensity.  Which one of these two types of firms will advertise more would depend on 
strength of the effect of price and quality on conversion rate vis-à-vis contribution of the 
price and quality attribute on a firm’s profit margin (per unit). 
 
4.4 DATA 
Caves and Greene (1996) call for “studies that are more closely focused (individual 
product markets?) or gain access to better data on he extent and adequacy of buyers' 
information sets”.  Unlike traditional studies, I examine the relationship at the most 
granular level i.e., individual product markets having only those firms who are in a 
consumer’s information set.   
Data Description 
I collect data from a comparison shopping engine, hereafter referred as CompShop, 
which is one of the largest comparison shopping engines.  This shopping engine reaches 
15% of online shoppers each month and held more than 15% of the market share in 2005.  
As shown in Figure 4.2, the engine displays a list of firms selling a specific product to the 
consumer who searched for that product.   
The listings provide the price charged by the firms and the quality ratings of the 
firms, in addition to other relevant information.  CompShop allots top 3 ranks on the 
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shopping list to the firms who emerge as the top 3 bidders in an auction conducted by it.  
Firms willing to pay more (i.e., having higher advertising intensity) for every potential 
customer visit to their website get higher rank in the listing.  Other firms in the market 
have lower advertising intensity than these top 3 firms and are ordered in the listing based 
on the price of their product.  I examine the relationship between price, quality and 
advertising (i.e., reflected in the rank that a firm buys on the listing) in this market. 
I collect data for 221 specific products (such as “Canon EOS 400D / Rebel XTi Body 
Only Digital Camera”, “Coby CX-CD114 Personal CD Player”, “Casio Exilim EX-S600 
Digital Camera”, etc.,) within 6 broad electronics product categories (camcorder, camera, 
notebook, palm/PDA, CD/DVD player, CD/DVD Recorder) over a period of 28 days.  
Data includes the rank of the firms in the listing, quality rating of the firms (provided by 
consumers), number of consumers who rated the firm, p ice of the product, shipping and 
tax, presence of logo and other special text/image, etc.   
I use the rank of a firm in a product listing as a proxy of its advertising intensity as 
the top three featured firms are ranked based on their advertising intensity.  However, 
since the firms below the third slot are ordered based on their price instead of their 
advertising bids, I do not observe their relative advertising/bidding intensity.  In other 
words the advertising intensity is censored and ranges between 1 and 3.  I code the rank 
variable as 3 for the featured firm on the first rank, 2 for the second featured firm, 1 for 
the third featured firm, and zero for the rest of the firms in the listing (i.e., the firms that 
had bid lower than the 3rd highest bidder).  The price variable captures the total price that 
a consumer would have to pay to buy from a firm.  The quality proxy is calculated by 
multiplying the average customer ratings for a firm (which range from 0 to 5) by log(total 
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number of customers who rated the firm)12.  I create average rank, average price and 
average quality across the 28 days time period for each of the firms in a market.  Then, I 
create AdRank variable by sorting the firms in ascending order, based on the average 
rank within a product market, and assigning a rank such that the firm which had the 
highest average rank was assigned Adrank=(n-1) where n is the number of firms in that 
product market13.  Similarly I create PriceRank, and QualityRank variables.  I also create 
a dummy variable, “Advertiser”, which is equal to one if a firm advertises in a product 
market (i.e., appears in the top 3 ranks) and zero otherwise.  To distinguish between firms 
who sell a wide variety of products from the firms who specialize in fewer products, I 
create “MarketPresence” variable which measures the number of product markets in 
which a firm competes (i.e., a proxy for product variety/assortment).   
Further, I supplement this dataset by collecting additional information about 
firms’ characteristics from Alexa.com.  Specifically, I collect a firm’s overall traffic rank 
(which is a proxy for the brand equity of a firm) and the duration of a firm’s online 
existence.  Similar to AdRank, PriceRank, and QualityRank, I create TrafficRank14 and 
AgeRank variable by sorting the firms within a product market by traffic rank and age 
respectively, and assigning ranks.  The dataset contains 2421 observations from 121 firms 
across 221 products in 6 product categories.  Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 
4.2.  The average rank (i.e., advertising intensity), excluding zeroes, ranges from 1 to 3 
with a mean of 1.9 and a standard deviation of 0.8.  The non-advertiser group (i.e., firms 
which never advertised) charge lower price (mean=622.7) than advertiser group 
(mean=671.1).  However the price difference is not significant (t=-0.57, p=0.57).  On the 
                                               
12We weight the ratings by log(number of raters) to get reliable quality measure.    
13 The AdRank of the firms which had an average rank of zero were assigned Adrank=0 
14 TrafficRank is reverse coded such that lower number m ans higher brand equity or more traffic. 
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other hand, the quality (i.e., RatingsXlog(Raters)) of advertisers is higher (mean=27.2) 
than quality of non-advertisers (mean=25.4) and the quality difference is significant (t= -
3.69, p<0.01)15. 
The correlation coefficients are shown in Table 4.3.  However, these correlations, 
especially those with respect to AdRank, should be interpreted with caution as they do 
not correct for the fact that AdRank is not observed for a large number of observations 
and is set to be zero for such firms.  It seems that those firms that have higher quality 
charge a higher price.  Similarly, firms which have stronger brand equity (i.e., more 
traffic or lower TrafficRank) as well as firms whic have longer online presence charge 
higher price.  Firms which have a broader product assortment, on the other hand, charge a 
lower price.   
4.5 RESULTS 
The empirical model to test the relationship between price, quality and advertising, as 
shown below, is based on equation 6: 
AdRankij = α0 + β1*PriceRankij + β2*QualityRankij + β3*TrafficRankij +   
     β4*AgeRankij + β5*MarketPresenceij + εij    (7) 
The main variables of interest are PriceRank and QualityRank.  I use TrafficRank, 
AgeRank and MarketPresence as control variables.  Bfore estimating this model where 
the dependent variable, AdRank, is a continuous variable measuring the relative 
advertising intensity of firms, I test a model to predict which firm is more likely to 
advertise.  Therefore, instead of AdRank, I use Advertiser (a binary variable denoting 
                                               
15 The mean of ratings as well as mean of number of raters for advertisers group is also significantly higher 
than those of non-advertisers.    
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whether a firm is advertiser or non-advertiser) as dependent variable and employ probit 
regression.   
Advertiserij = α0 + β1*PriceRankij + β2*QualityRankij + β3*TrafficRankij +     
β4*AgeRankij + β5*MarketPresenceij + εij    (8) 
The results of probit regression are presented in Table 4.4.  In Model 1, I only 
include the control variables.  I add PriceRank andQualityRank in Model 2 to estimate 
equation 8.  I add the interaction term between price and quality in Model 3 to examine 
the possibility of a more complicated relationship between price and quality.    
Model 2 suggests that price and quality explain variation in a firm’s propensity to 
advertise above and beyond the control variables (chi2(2)=39.38; p<0.01).  I find that the 
lower price firms (beta=-0.013) and higher quality firms (beta=0.016) are more likely to 
be among the advertiser group.  Further, the results ggest that firms with larger brand 
equity (beta=-.057), firms with relatively less online experience, and firms having smaller 
product assortment are more likely to advertise.  Model 3 includes the interaction term 
between price and quality and explains significantly larger variance than Model 2.  The 
interaction term is significant and is shown in Figure 4.3.  Firms with low price and 
higher quality are most likely to advertise.  However, among the firms charging high 
price, lower quality firms are more likely advertise than high quality firms. 
Next, I examine the relative advertising intensity of firms by using the continuous 
dependent variable -- AdRank.  As mentioned earlier, AdRank is a proxy of the 
advertising intensity of the firms.  However, I do n t observe the advertising intensity of 
the firms whose advertising intensity is lower than a threshold such that they are either 
unwilling to or unable to come to the top three ranks in the comparison shopping listing.  
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The advertising intensity of these firms is recorded as zero.  Thus, the appropriate 
empirical model is a censored tobit model where A* is the latent advertising intensity: 
Ai* = β xi + εi 
However, we observe A, such that 
Ai= Ai*  if  A i*> c, and Ai = 0     if  Ai* ≤ c 
Using ordinary least square regression on the full sample or on the non-zero 
observations will bias the coefficients as the sample consists of two different sets of 
observations.  The first set contains the observations for which we know only the values 
of the independent variables (i.e., X’s) and the fact that dependent variable (A*) is less 
than or equal to threshold c.  The second set consists of all observations for which the 
values of both X and A* are known.  Therefore, I use a censored tobit model (Tobin 
1958) to estimate the advertising intensity of firms as specified by equation 7.  Further, 
since the advertising rank is assigned to the firms based on their average rank on the 
listing over the sampling time period, we need to take into account that some firms may 
appear consistently in the top three ranks (i.e., advertising slots) whereas others may 
appear in the top three ranks irregularly.  I, therefore, weight each observation in the tobit 
regression model, by the total number of days on which they appeared in the top three 
positions, such that firms who appear more frequently i  the top ranks get a larger weight 
in the likelihood function16.   
The tobit regression results, shown in Table 4.5, are similar to the probit results with 
binary advertising dependent variable.  In model 2 which maps to equation 7, I find that 
lower the price charged by a firm higher is its advertising intensity (beta=-0.037) and 
                                               
16 We analyzed the data without using the weights and found the results to be consistent.     
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higher the quality of a firm higher is its advertising intensity (beta=0.064).  Comparing 
the empirical coefficients on P and Q with coefficients in equation 6, we can infer that in 
the comparison shopping market, higher price reduces conversion efficiency (i.e., leads to 
lost advertising expenditure) much more strongly than what can be compensated by the 
higher price.  Further, lower quality also reduces onversion inefficiency much more 
strongly than what can be compensated by the lower cost of producing/serving lower 
quality.  Therefore, I find firms with lower price and higher quality to advertise more and 
obtain top ranks in the listing. 
Last, in model 3, I empirically test the interaction effect between price and 
quality.  The interaction term is significant and the effect is depicted in Figure 4.4.  
Results suggest that the lower the price and higher the quality, higher will be a firm’s 
advertising intensity.  However, lower quality firm’s advertising intensity increases the 
higher the price charged by the firm.   
Also, similar to probit regression, I find that firms that have stronger brand name and 
that sell smaller product assortment are more likely to advertise.   
 
4.6 DISCUSSION 
The results indicate that price and quality are related to advertising intensity of firms 
in the online directional markets.  However, I find that the relationship between price, 
quality and advertising in the online directional markets is very different than traditional 
markets.  Unlike the empirical findings in traditional market that suggests that higher 
price and higher quality firms advertise most (Archibald, Haulman et al. 1983; Thomas, 
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Shane et al. 1998), the results of this study show t at directional markets lead to better 
outcomes where higher quality but lower price firms advertise the most.   
I suggest that this unique outcome is a consequence of th  directional nature of the 
online market which determines consumers’ search and purchase behavior which in turn 
influences firms’ advertising strategies in directional markets (such as comparison 
shopping engine).  These results provide support to the theoretical arguments that unique 
nature of directional market makes firms employ different strategies than traditional 
markets and thus leads to different market outcomes (P rry and Wigderson 1986; 
Arbatskaya forthcoming).  However, contrary to the suggestion that firms which appear 
higher on the advertisement listing would have higher price (Arbatskaya forthcoming), I 
find that low price and high quality firms are more likely to spend more on advertising 
and appear higher on the comparison shopping listing.   
To understand this outcome, we need to examine the factors that may affect the value 
that a firm gets from appearing higher on the listing.  Ceteris paribus, appearing on higher 
ranks is more valuable to all the firms as it brings more traffic to a firm’s online store.  
However, I argue that the value that a firm gets from appearing higher on the listing not 
only depends on the rank but also on the price and the quality of the firm, among other 
firm attributes such as brand name/equity.  Specifically, I suggest that higher price will 
decrease the clickthrough and conversion rate whereas higher quality will increase both 
clickthrough and conversion rate.  The lower conversion rate would increase the cost of 
customer acquisition due to higher inefficiency and wastage of advertising expenditure.  
Increasing conversion rate/efficiency by lowering price and increasing quality, however, 
comes at the cost of lower profit margin.  Thus the outcome of the tradeoff between these 
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opposing effects of price and quality on the profits of a firm would determine what type 
of firm (in terms of price and quality) is more likely to advertise more.  Based on the 
result that firms with lower price and higher quality value higher ranks more than others, 
it seems that higher price and lower quality have a ry strong negative impact on the 
conversion rate that cannot be compensated by the hig r profit margin17. 
Consistent with the conversion rate versus profit margin tradeoff logic, we find 
that as the gap between a firm’s price and quality becomes larger, the advertising 
intensity of the firm increases.  Though lower price and higher quality firms have higher 
advertising intensity (refer Figure 4.4), the likelhood of a firm that charges higher price 
and offers lower quality to have higher advertising i tensity increases as the price 
becomes higher and the quality becomes lower (i.e.,th  profit margin becomes  larger to 
overcome the loss due to lower conversion rate).  
As seen above, advertising in directional market allows two extreme type of firms 
-- cherries and lemons (refer Table 4.1) – to appear on the top of the listing.  Given the 
comparison shopping engine displays the firms in ascending order of price right below 
the three advertising spots, one would expect that firms with higher price would want to 
advertise to get ahead of the other low price sellers. On the other hand, one would not 
expect that the cherries (firms that offer the best deal in terms of price and quality) would 
not need to advertise in a shopping comparison market as consumers can easily spot them 
by sorting the list in the descending order of price (if needed) and then picking those 
firms which have high quality ratings.  However, the fact that cherries find it beneficial to 
pay advertising fee to appear on the top ranks (andare able to outbid other firms to obtain 
                                               
17 Given the maximum price that a firm can charge and the lowest quality that can be offered in a market. 
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top ranks) suggests that a large proportion of consumers visiting the online market incurs 
a high cognitive search cost and does not make an effort to resort the list and/or to 
include firms lower down the listing in their consideration set (Brynjolfsson, Dick et al. 
2004).   
Further, our observation that lemons too are able to pay more to get valuable rank 
in the listing suggests that a significant proportion of consumers buys from these lemon 
firms -- either because they are not sophisticated enough to identify the lemons in the 
market (in spite of the presence of quality ratings) or they do not carefully evaluate the 
price quality tradeoff due to bounded rationality.  However, the fact that cherries are 
more likely than lemons to have higher advertising intensity and thus obtain higher rank 
suggests that the proportion of consumers who chose lemons -- referred as uninformed 
consumers or tourists in analytical literature (Salop and Stiglitz 1977; Riordan 1986; 
Bagwell and Riordan 1991) -- is small.  We believe that the increase in the number of 
informed consumers would reduce the likelihood of lemons obtaining high ranks.     
Since occurrence of lemons on the top of the listing adversely affects consumer 
welfare, we suggest that the comparison shopping engin  should attempt to design 
advertisement allocation mechanisms such that possibility of lemons’ advertising is 
minimized.  One direct measure could be to weight the bids of the advertisers by their 
quality ratings.  An alternative approach could be to weight the bids by the conversion 
rate.  However it requires that advertisers’ conversion rate data be available to the 
comparison shopping engine and there are sufficient informed consumers in the market.      
A comparison shopping engine can also add functionality to its website to make it 
easier for consumers to identify the cherries.  Currently, almost all the shopping engines 
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allow consumers to sort the list by only one attribute at a time which makes the search 
process costly for a consumer who is trying to findthe firm that is best on more than one 
attributes.  Allowing consumers to sort the list on multiple attributes (such as weighted 
average of price and quality) and providing filtering tools may increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of consumers decision making.  It has been shown that subtle changes in 
information presentation formats can influence consumer choice behavior (Payne, 
Bettman et al. 1993; Hoque and Lohse 1999; Mandel and Johnson 2002) and we suggest 
that allowing more flexibility to the consumer to modify the information format may 
increase the probability of consumers to find cherries.  It would be interesting to examine 
how such change in the interface may affect consumer behavior, advertiser’s strategies 
and market outcomes. 
The results also suggest that firms that have higher brand awareness/equity (i.e. 
higher traffic) have higher advertising intensity.  This result is surprising as firms with 
strong brand name competing with unknown firms should be able to attract consumers 
even at the lower ranks and should not incur cost to appear on top ranks.  However, the 
result is consistent with the previous inference that consumers (at least a significant 
number) are naturally predisposed to visit the firms in the order in which they appear in 
the listing.  Thus, the directional nature of this market makes it valuable for even a 
branded firm to pay advertising cost to appear on top of the listing.   
Another interesting result is regarding the product assortment and advertising 
intensity.  In a traditional market, it has been argued that advertising is most valuable to 
low cost firm which offer low prices and large product variety and therefore firms with 
lower price and large product variety will advertise more (Bagwell and Ramey 1994).  
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On the other hand, I found that firms with lower product variety advertise more in a 
directional market.  It is possible that, in online markets, firms with a large product 
assortment do not have the significant cross-selling advantage due to consumers’ use of 
search engines as a starting point in their purchase process; also the firms with a 
specialized/narrow product assortment have cost advantages.  Future research should 
examine the underlying reasons for the higher advertising intensity of firms with lower 
product variety. 
Currently, we do not know how many consumers are aware that top ranks are 
advertisements and firms compete in an auction to ob ain those slots.  It would be 
interesting to see how that information affects or w uld affect consumer search and 
purchase behavior.  It is possible that consumers may use advertising expenditure as a 
signal of quality and may prefer to buy from the top ranked firms.  Future research should 
examine the impact of such advertising signal beliefs on consumer behavior and the 
consequent strategies of firms.  
I investigated the linkage between price, quality and dvertising in a directional 
market where price and quality information about a seller is provided in the 
advertisement itself.  However, it would be interesting to examine other directional 
markets such as sponsored search advertising where obtaining price and quality 




Extant research examining online markets has focused on the relationships between 
quality and price or between quality and advertising.  This is the first study that examines 
the advertising intensity in an online market as a function of price and quality.       
Advertising has been generally considered to have two roles – persuasive (changes 
consumers’ taste and brand loyalty) and informative (informs consumers about price 
and/or quality).  I examine an online directional market, specifically a comparison 
shopping engine, where advertising not only informs consumers about price and quality 
but also directs consumer search pattern/sequence.  I find that the advertising outcomes in 
this market are strikingly different than the traditional markets.  This study shows that 
low price and high quality firms exhibit high advertising intensity and are able to obtain 
high rank in the advertisement listing.  I suggest conversion versus profit margin tradeoff 
as a potential explanation for this outcome.   
This study empirically tests the conclusions of the analytical model that proposes a 
positive relationship between price and quality in such directional markets (Arbatskaya, 
Forthcoming).  In addition the results will also allow a researcher to develop analytical 
model that describes the real market relationships.   
This research will have significant implications for welfare and public policy.  The 
findings will also help market makers such as comparison shopping engines to 
understand the market dynamics and develop mechanisms to provide better outcomes to 
consumers as well as to increase their profits. 
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CHAPTER 4: EPILOGUE 
 
Sponsored search and comparison shopping advertising, enabled by Internet 
technologies, present new opportunities and challenges to the market participants.  The 
two primary features that differentiate these new forms of advertising from other 
traditional advertising media are the nature of consumer search and the mechanism to 
price the advertisements.  Consumers typically search the sponsored search 
advertisements from top to the bottom of the listing a d sellers compete in an auction to 
obtain better positions on the sponsored search advertisement listing.  However, the 
impact of these features on consumers and advertisers is not clear.  This dissertation 
examines the validity of theories developed for tradi ional media in an emerging online 
sponsored search context and provides valuable insights for future research.  
Investigation of consumer behavior in online sponsored search markets will enable 
researchers to develop more realistic normative models and help practitioners develop 
better advertisements campaigns.   
The first essay draws on the consumer search and directional markets literature to 
understand the implications of seller’s strategies on eller’s advertisement performance.  
The results validate the research hypothesis that search listing can act as a consumer 
filtering mechanism and competition intensity within adjacent ranks has significant 
impact on a seller’s performance.  The essay also contributes to the directional search 
literature by examining the effect of directional search on the performance of a firm. 
The second essay provides evidence that like traditional markets, consumers rely 
on quality signals in electronic markets.  However, the unique format of the sponsored 
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search listing significantly increases the strength of the advertising signal vis-à-vis price 
signal.  The essay also adds to the signaling literature by introducing and empirically 
testing the moderating role of risk attitude on the usage of quality signaling cues. 
The third essay examines the market outcomes in directional markets such as 
sponsored search and comparison shopping advertising.  Specifically, we focus on 
comparison shopping advertising where advertising not o ly informs consumers about 
price and quality but also directs consumer search pattern/sequence.  We find that the 
advertising outcomes in this market are strikingly different than the traditional markets.  
Our study shows that low price and high quality firms exhibit high advertising intensity 
and are able to obtain high rank in the advertisement listing.  We suggest conversion 
versus profit margin tradeoff as a potential explanation for this outcome.   
Overall, the findings of this dissertation will have significant implications for the 
sellers/advertisers on online sponsored search and comparison shopping mechanisms, as 
well as for the online intermediaries managing these online advertising markets.  Insights 
from these studies will enable practitioners to develop appropriate advertising strategies 
and to choose effective and efficient position allocation mechanisms for the sponsored 
listings.  Online intermediaries would also benefit from a better alignment of the 




Figure 1.1 An Example of a Sponsored Search Listing 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Conceptual Model 
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Figure 2.5a Interaction between Rank and USP in the Presence of Low Competition 
 









































Figure 2.6a Interaction between USP and Competitive Intensity at Top Ranks 
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Figure 4.1 Illustration of the V and R functional specification 
  
Margin/Unit (V) as a function of P and Q Conversion Rate (R) as a function of P and Q 
 
 



























































Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max 
CTR 1556 0.049636 0.047139 0 0.401 
Log(Rank) 1556 0.574577 0.399923 0.086178 1.957274 
USP 1556 0.513496 0.499979 0 1 
CI 1556 0.541292 0.458159 0 1 
 
Table 2.2 Correlation Coefficients 








CTR 1.00        
         
log(Rank) -0.13 1.00       
 (0.00)        
USP -0.10 0.19 1.00      
 (0.00) (0.00)       
log(Rank)XUSP 0.05 0.32 -0.01 1.00     
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.68)      
CI -0.16 0.01 0.42 -0.12 1.00    
 (0.00) (0.71) (0.00) (0.00)     
log(Rank)XCI 0.11 0.02 -0.12 0.25 -0.12 1.00   
 (0.00) (0.54) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
USPXCI 0.07 -0.13 -0.03 -0.07 -0.09 0.20 1.00  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
log(Rank)XCIXUSP -0.14 0.25 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.18 -0.09 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.52) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
p values below the correlation coefficients 
 
Table 2.3 Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 CTR CTR CTR CTR CTR CTR CTR 
Log(Rank)  -0.037 -0.037 -0.044 -0.043 -0.043 -0.039 
  (10.61)** (10.61)** (12.59)** (12.43)** (12.27)** (10.82)** 
USP (Price=1; Quality=0)   0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
   (0.11) (0.28) (0.11) (0.09) (0.15) 
Log(Rank)XUSP    0.064 0.063 0.062 0.051 
    (9.20)** (9.04)** (8.94)** (7.18)** 
CI     -0.004 -0.004 0.000 
     (1.74) ‡ (1.56)  (0.07) 
CIXUSP      0.005 -0.003 
      (0.98) (0.62) 
CIXlog(Rank)       0.037 
       (5.73)** 
CIXlog(Rank)XUSP       -0.063 
       (4.83)** 
Keyword Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.045 0.051 0.051 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 
 (23.35)** (26.27)** (21.65)** (19.92)** (19.78)** (19.39)** (19.82)** 
Observations 1554 1554 1554 1554 1554 1554 1554 
R-squared 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.40 
(Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses)               ‡ significant at 10%;  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics 




Dev. Min Max N Mean 
Std.  




SearchIntensity 38 2.87 1.38 1 9.20 42 3.05 1.68 1.30 10 -0.38 
PricePremium 38 32.69 20.62 2.40 78.70 42 22.67 16.58 1.70 53.8 2.27** 
RankPreference 38 4.60 1.14 2.40 6.90 42 4.20 1.45 1.80 7.5 1.48 
HPHQ 38 4.97 1.43 1 7.00 42 4.90 1.27 1 7 0.30 
HRHQ 38 2.44 1.09 1 4.33 42 4.60 1.36 2 7 -7.78***  
Safe 38    5.42    1.91          0 9 42 4.92 1.64 0 9 1.23 
t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 3.2 Correlation Coefficients 
  A B C D E F G 
A. Treatment 1.00       
         
B. Search 
Intensity 
0.04 1.00      
  (0.70)       
C. Price 
Premium 
-0.25 -0.02 1.00     
  (0.03) (0.87)      
D. Rank 
preference 
-0.16 -0.03 0.56 1.00    
  (0.14) (0.80) (0.00)     
E. HPHQ -0.03 -0.07 0.44 0.19 1.00   
  (0.76) (0.55) (0.00) (0.09)    
F. HRHQ 0.66 -0.01 -0.33 -0.29 -0.06 1.00  
  (0.00) (0.95) (0.00) (0.01) (0.57)   
G. Safe -0.14 -0.13 0.01 0.07 -0.12 -0.18 1.00 
  (0.22) (0.27) (0.95) (0.52) (0.31) (0.11)  




Table 3.3  Percentiles of Search Intensity, Price and Rank preference   
  Search Intensity Price Premium Rank Preference 
Percentile Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment 
1% 1 1.3 2.4 1.7 2.4 1.8 
5% 1.2 1.6 3.2 2.5 2.5 2 
10% 1.4 1.7 5.8 3.1 3 2.3 
25% 2.1 2.2 15 10.1 4 3.1 
50% 2.6 2.6 33.55 18.6 4.7 3.9 
75% 3.5 3.4 46.8 44.3 5.2 5.4 
90% 4.2 4.3 60.5 48.1 6 5.8 
95% 4.6 6.1 76.3 49.8 6.5 6.4 
99% 9.2 10 78.7 53.8 6.9 7.5 
N 38 42 38 42 38 42 
Mean 2.87 3.05 32.69 22.167 4.60 4.20 
Std.  Dev. 1.38 1.68 20.62 16.58 1.14 1.45 
 
 
Table 3.4  Quality Beliefs and Shopping Behavior*  













HPHQ‡ -0.063 5.87 0.14 -0.159 4.981 0.177 
 (-0.48) (4.26)*** (1.35) (1.10) (3.38)*** (1.50) 
HRHQ‡ 0.018 -3.98 -.023 -0.033 -4.209 -0.213 
 (0.17) (-3.54)*** (-2.65)*** (0.30) (3.71)*** (2.35)** 
safe‡     -0.154 -0.267 0.071 
    (1.51) (0.26) (0.85) 
HPHQ*HRHQ 0..05 -0.74 -0.04 0.060 -0.830 -0.008 
 (0.69) (-0.93) (-0.68) (0.64) (0.86) (0.10) 
HPHQ*safe    -0.031 -0.266 0.073 
    (0.48) (0.41) (1.40) 
HRHQ*safe    -0.065 -1.852 -0.040 
    (0.84) (2.34)** (0.62) 
HPHQ*HRHQ*safe    -0.054 -0.784 -0.009 
    (1.16) (1.65)* (0.23) 
Constant 2.97 26.67 4.36 2.968 26.042 4.370 
 (17.46)*** (15.06)*** (31.43)*** (16.97)*** (14.58)*** (30.61)*** 
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 80 
R-square 0.01 0.31 0.11 0.05   0.36   0.14 
Chi-square 0.95 36.54 10.09 4.38 45.59*** 13.52* 
z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 




Table 4.1: Conversion Inefficiency versus Profit Margin 
Quality  
High Low 
High  Fair Deal Lemons 
Worst Deal  for consumers therefore should 
be translated to lowest conversion rate; 




Low  Cherries 
Best Deal  for consumers therefore should 
be translated to highest conversion rate; 





Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Non-Advertisers Advertisers 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std.  
Dev. Min Max Obs Mean 
Std.  
Dev. Min Max 
AverageRank 1635 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 786 1.9 0.8 1.0 3.0 
Average 
TotalPrice 1635 662.7 774.9 8.0 7504.2 786 671.1 834.7 29.9 5340.2 
Ratings 1635 3.9 0.7 0.0 5.0 786 4.0 0.9 0.0 5.0 
Raters 1635 1727.9 2977.6 0.0 44294.3 786 1988.9 3083.1 0.0 44299.8 
RatingsX 
log(Raters) 1635 25.4 9.0 0.0 48.3 786 27.2 9.9 0.0 48.3 
AdRank 1635 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 786 3.3 2.1 1.0 11.0 
PriceRank 1635 16.1 11.7 1.0 55.0 786 11.0 9.1 1.0 54.0 
QualityRank 1635 15.8 11.1 1.0 56.0 786 13.5 11.2 1.0 55.0 
TrafficRank 1635 131548 330872 26.0 6288723 786 21440  764784 26.0 6288723 
OnlineAge 1635 3581.1 1284.0 382.0 7337.0 786 3478.7 1233.5 385.0 7337.0 
MarketPresence 1635 27.2 18.9 0.4 73.8 786 27.9 15.9 0.4 73.8 
Table 4.3 Correlation Coefficients 
 Only Advertisers All Firms 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.  AdRank 1      1      
             
2.  PriceRank 0.12 1     -0.14 1     
 (0.0)      (0.0)      
3.  QualityRank 0.14 0.23 1    -0.04 0.31 1    
 (0.0) (0.0)     (0.0) (0.0)     
4.  TrafficRank 0.03 0.00 0.44 1   -0.21 0.17 0.28 1   
 (0.4) (0.9) (0.0)    (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)    
5.  AgeRank 0.12 0.79 0.50 0.00 1  -0.11 0.67 0.43 -0.06 1  
 (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.9)   (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)   
6.  MarketPresence 0.01 0.04 0.15 -0.36 0.23 1 0.01 -0.11 -0.08 -0.42 0.16 1 
 (0.7) (0.2) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)  (0.5) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)  
P values below the correlation coefficients in parenth ses 
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Table 4.4 Probit Regression Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Advertiser Advertiser Advertiser 
TrafficRank -0.050 -0.057 -0.065 
 (14.27)** (14.35)** (15.58)** 
AgeRank -0.025 -0.023 -0.032 
 (9.20)** (5.44)** (6.99)** 
MarketPresence -0.008 -0.010 -0.009 
 (4.53)** (5.49)** (5.14)** 
PriceRank  -0.013 0.024 
  (3.41)** (3.83)** 
QualityRank  0.016 0.051 
  (5.30)** (9.14)** 
PriceRankXQualityRank   -0.002 
   (7.24)** 
Constant 0.668 0.714 0.395 
 (8.01)** (8.16)** (4.08)** 
Observations 2421 2421 2421 
Pseudo R-square 0.10 0.12 0.14 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses;  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table 4.5: Tobit Regression Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 AdRank AdRank AdRank 
TrafficRank -0.182 -0.209 -0.238 
 (13.19)** (13.48)** (15.13)** 
AgeRank -0.104 -0.106 -0.137 
 (9.67)** (6.46)** (8.24)** 
MarketPresence -0.013 -0.021 -0.019 
 (2.01)* (3.07)** (2.91)** 
PriceRank  -0.037 0.131 
  (2.55)* (5.68)** 
QualityRank  0.064 0.215 
  (5.46)** (10.48)** 
PriceRankXQualityRank   -0.010 
   (8.70)** 
Constant 2.369 2.495 1.024 
 (7.48)** (7.59)** (2.88)** 
Observations 2348  2348 2348 
Pseudo R-square 0.05 0.06  0.07 
1562 observations left censored; 786 uncensored observations 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses;  




APPENDIX A:  TYPOLOGY OF ONLINE ADVERTISING 
Display Advertising–advertiser pays an online company for space to display a static or 
hyper-linked banner or logo on one or more of the online company’s pages. 
Sponsorship–advertiser sponsors targeted Web site or email areas (e.g., entire web site, 
site area, an event, parts or all of an email message).  Sponsorships can and usually do 
contain some banner elements.  To the extent possible, eparate and report revenues for 
other formats contained within the sponsorship campaign. 
E-mail –banner ads, links or advertiser sponsorships that appear in e-mail newsletters, e-
mail marketing campaigns and other commercial e-mail communications.  Includes all 
types of electronic mail (e.g., basic text or HTML-enabled). 
Search–fees advertisers pay online companies to list and/or link their company site 
domain name to a specific search word or phrase (includes paid search revenues).  Search 
categories include: 
•Paid listings–text links appear at the top or side of search results for specific keywords.  
The more a marketer pays, the higher the position i gets.  Marketers only pay when a 
user clicks on the text link. 
•Contextual search–text links appear in an article based on the context of the content, 
instead of a user-submitted keyword.  Payment only ccurs when the link is clicked. 
•Paid inclusion–guarantees that a marketer’s URL is indexed by a search engine.  The 
listing is determined by the engine's search algorithms.   
•Site optimization–modifies a site to make it easier for search engines to automatically 
index the site and hopefully result in better placement in results.   
Referrals / Lead Generation*–fees advertisers pay to online companies that refer
qualified purchase inquiries (e.g., auto dealers which pay a fee in exchange for receiving 
a qualified purchase inquiry online) or provide consumer information (demographic, 
contact, behavioral) where the consumer opts into being contacted by a marketer (email, 
postal, telephone, fax).  These processes are priced on a performance basis (e.g., cost-per-
action, -lead or -inquiry), and can include user applications (e.g., for a credit card), 
surveys, contests (e.g., sweepstakes) or registrations. 
Classifieds and auctions–fees advertisers pay online companies to list specific products 
or services (e.g., online job boards and employment listings, real estate listings, 
automotive listings, auction-based listings, yellow pages). 
Rich media–advertisements that integrate some component of streaming video and/or 
audio and interactivity, in addition to flash or java script ads, and can allow users to view 
and interact with products or services (e.g., a multi edia product description, a “virtual 
test-drive”).  “Interstitials” have been consolidated within the rich media category and 
represent full-or partial-page text and image server-push advertisements which appear in 
the transition between two pages of content.  Forms of interstitials can include splash 
screens, pop-up windows and superstitials. 
Slotting fees–fees charged to advertisers by online companies to secure premium 
positioning of an advertisement on their site, category exclusivity or similar preference 
positioning (similar to slotting allowances charged by retailers). 
 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005), “IAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report: 
2005 Second Quarter Results” 
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APPENDIX B1:  INSTRUCTIONS FOR SHOPPING TASK 
Welcome to the Experiment  
The experiment consists of 3 parts and will take approximately 60 minutes to complete. 
1: Shopping task.  
2: Survey consisting of multiple choice questions.  
3: Lottery selection task. 
  
You will earn experimental currency (referred as E$) based on your decisions in the shopping and lottery 
selection task. 
After the experiment is over, 25 participants (out f approximately l25 participants) who have earned the highest 
experimental currency will be given cash award (or equivalent gift coupons). You will be notified about the 
results by email.  
 
The higher the experimental cash you earn, the higher will be the monetary reward (if you are among the 
top 25 earners). The amount of cash will be proportional to the experim ntal currency earned.  
The experimental currency will be converted at the rate of E$1 = US $0.025.  
The value of each cash reward (or gift coupon) can be upto US $25.  
I: SHOPPING TASK:  
Instructions: GENERAL  
You will go on 10 different online shopping trips. In each trip you will buy a different product.  
Each product is sold by a different set of 10 sellers.  
Assume that you are in a shopping situation where all the sellers are unknown/unfamiliar to you. The 
sellers shown are real sellers but their identities (name and actual website content) have been hidden to 
simulate unfamiliar markets conditions.  
Search Procedure:  
The sellers differ in quality (i.e. product condition, delivery time, customer service, etc.,) and charge 
different price for the product. 
You can discover the price charged by a seller by visiting the seller's website. However, you do not have 
any information about the quality of the sellers. You cannot identify the quality even after visiting a 
seller's website. 
Quality is an important factor in your purchase decision, you will have to make your own inferences 
about the quality of the sellers.  
 
Search Effort: 
You will incur a search effort of E$ 5 every time you visit a new seller's website (i.e. click on the seller's 
link)  
In other words, the time and effort spent in visiting a seller is worth E$ 5 to you. 
The more new sellers you visit, the higher will be your total search effort. 
For example, if you visit 4 sellers, your total search effort will be equal to 4 X E$5 = E$20  
Your total search effort at any given point during a shopping trip will be displayed on the top of thescreen.  
 
Search Sequence: 
You may stop after visiting the first seller, or you may continue searching as many times as you wish.  
 
Recall: 
Each time you see a seller’s price, you may either accept it and stop searching, or you may reject it and 
search more.  
You will NOT incur a search effort again if you visit a previously visited seller. 
After each shopping trip, you will be shown the total cost (i.e. the price of purchased product and total 
search effort) incurred by you in that trip. Then, you will be asked to provide your perception about the 
quality of the seller. 
Click here to go to NEXT page 
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Objective : In each shopping trip, you will be purchasing a different product. 
Your objective is to maximize your payoff by buying the product from highest quality seller at the lowest 
price while minimizing your search effort.  
Your payoff in each shopping trip will be calculated (but not shown to you during the experiment) as 
follows: 
Payoff = (Quality of the seller chosen) - (Price Paid for the product) – (Total Search Effort to visit 
new sellers)  
      where Total Search Effort = (Total number of sellers visited)*(search effort to visit one seller)    
At the end of the experiment, one of your 10 trips will be randomly selected .  
We will use the quality of the seller chosen by youon this trip to calculate your payoffs. This payoff will 
be your final payoff.  
Range of Quality in each product market (i.e. shopping trip)   
Quality of sellers in each product market varies significantly. The actual quality of the sellers will not be 
revealed during the experiment. However, you will be informed about the maximum and minimum seller 
quality (denoted in E$) in each product market.  
 
Range of Price in each product market (i.e. shopping trip)   
Price range in each product market also varies. You will be informed about the expected maximum and 
minimum price available in each product market (i.e. shopping trip).  
 
Payoff Calculation Example: 
       Assume that you bought the product at price equal to E$150 after visiting 4 sellers.  
      Since search effort to visit a seller is E$5 , therefore your total search effort is E$ 20 (i.e. 4*5).  
      Your total cost = E$ 150 + E$ 20 = E$ 170  
Then, quality of the seller (from whom you bought the product) is obtained by using the 
satisfaction ratings provided by real customers for that seller.  
If we find that the quality of the seller (from whom you bought the product) is E$ 500 then your 
payoff will be: 500 - 170 = E$ 330;  
      However, if we find that the quality of the sller is E$ 300 then your payoff will be: 300 - 170 = E$ 130  
            Click here to go to PREVIOUS page  Click here to go to NEXT page  
 
Instructions: Summary 
• There will be 10 shopping trips . In each shopping trip, you will buy a different product.  
You will have the option to observe one or more sellers' prices. Sellers are real but their identities have 
been hidden.  
• Quality of sellers in each product market varies significantly.  
The range of quality (i.e. maximum and minimum quality) in each product market will be provided to you.  
• Price in each product market also varies.  
The range of prices (i.e. maximum and minimum price) in each product market will be provided to you.  
• You may stop the search sequence at any time and accept any offer observed thus far.  
There is no limit  to the number of sellers you can visit.  
However, you incur a search effort worth E$ 5 to visit an unvisited seller. 
• At the end, one of your 10 trips will be randomly selected. 
Your payoffs for this trip will be calculated and this payoff will be treated as your final payoff.  
25 best performers (based on the their payoff in the randomly selected round) will be given monetary 
reward.  
The higher the final payoff, the higher will be the reward. You can earn a reward upto US $ 25.  
You will be notified about your payoff by email.  
NOTE: You should try to maximize your payoff in EVERY shopping trip as any one of the shopping 
trips may be randomly picked to determine your payoff.   
 
Click here to go to the PREVIOUS page     Click here to START the Shopping Task  
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APPENDIX B3: SURVEY ITEMS 
 
Rank-Quality Belief (HRHQ) 
 
Please answer all questions (to the best of your ability) 
on a scale of 1 to 7. 
Strongly Disagree   Strongly Agree  
I believe that highest quality sellers were on the top of the 
list.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe that a seller on top of the list was more 
established than other sellers. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe that a seller on top of the list was more reputable 
than other sellers. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Price-Quality Belief (HPHQ) 
 
Please answer all questions (to the best of your ability) 
on a scale of 1 to 7. 
Strongly Disagree   Strongly Agree  
I believe that there was a correlation between the price 
being charged by a seller and his quality . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe that the seller charging higher price was the 
higher quality seller.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Ad Expenditure Manipulation 
  
Please answer all questions (to the best of your ability) 
on a scale of 1 to 7. 
Strongly Disagree   Strongly Agree  
The seller on the first position incurred the highest 
adverting cost than the rest of the sellers on the list 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The seller on the third position incurred higher advertising 
cost than the seller on the fourth position on the list 




APPENDIX B4: LOTTERY SELECTION TASK 
Instructions 
 
In this part of the experiment there will be two rounds of the same lottery selection task.  
 
You will be making choices between two lotteries, such as those represented as "Option A" and "Option B" 
below. The money prizes are determined by the computer equivalent of throwing a ten-sided die. Each 
outcome, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, is equally likely.    
Decision Option A  Option B  Your Choice 
1st 
E$2.00 if the die is 1 
E$1.60 if the die is 2 – 10 
 
E$3.85 if the die is 1 
E$0.10 if the die is 2 - 10 
 A:  or B:   
 
Thus if you choose Option A, you will have a 1 in 10 chance of earning $2.00 and a 9 in 10 chance of 
earning $1.60. Similarly, Option B offers a 1 in 10 chance of earning $3.85 and a 9 in 10 chance of earning 
$0.10.  
You will make 10 such decision in each round. Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of 
these will end up being used. Once again, the selection of the one to be used depends on the "throw of the 
die" that is determined by the computer's random nuber generator. No decision is any more likely to be 
used than any other, and you will not know in advance which one will be selected, so please think about 
each one carefully. This random selection of a decision fixes the row (i.e. the Decision) that will be used.  
Decision Option A  Option B  Your Choice 
1st 
E$2.00 if the die is 1 
E$1.60 if the die is 2 – 10  
E$3.85 if the die is 1 





E$2.00 if the die is 1 - 2
E$1.60 if the die is 3 – 10 
 
E$3.85 if the die is 1 - 2
E$0.10 if the die is 3 - 10 




$2.00 if the die is 1 – 9
$1.60 if the die is 10  
$3.85 if the die is 1 - 9
$0.10 if the die is 10  A:  or B:   
10th 
$2.00 if the die is 1 - 10 $3.85 if the die is 1 - 10  A:  or B:   
For example, suppose that you make all ten decisions and the throw of the die is 9, then your choice, A or 
B, for decision 9 below would be used and the other decisions would not be used. After the random die 
throw fixes the Decision row that will be used, we need to obtain a second random number that determins 
the earnings for the Option you chose for that row. In Decision 9 below, for example, a throw of 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 will result in the higher payoff for the option you chose, and a throw of 10 will result in the 
lower payoff.  For decision 10, the random die throw will not be needed, since the choice is between 
amounts of money that are fixed: $2.00 for Option A and $3.85 for Option B 
• Making Ten Decisions: After you finish these instructions, you will see a table with 10 decisions 
in 10 separate rows, and you choose by clicking on the buttons on the right, option A or option B, 
for each of the 10 rows. You may make these choices in any order and change them as much as 
you wish until you press the Submit button at the bottom. 
• The Relevant Decision: One of the rows is then selected at random, and the Option (A or B) that 
you chose in that row will be used to determine your earnings. Note: Please think about each 
decision carefully, since each row is equally likely to end up being the one that is used to 
determine payoffs. 
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• Determining the Payoff for Each Round: After one of the decisions has been randomly selected, 
the computer will generate another random number that corresponds to the throw of a ten sided 
die. The number is equally likely to be 1, 2, 3, ... 10. This random number determines your 
earnings for the Option (A or B) that you previously elected for the decision being used.  
• Determining the Final Payoff: There will be 2 rounds, and therefore, you will encounter 2 choice 
menus, each with 10 rows. You will find out your eanings for each of these menus as one of the 
rows is randomly selected. Please Note: We will use all rounds to determine your final earnings. 




• You will indicate an option, A or B, for each of the rows by clicking on the "radio buttons" on the 
right side of the table. 
• Then a random number fixes which row of the table (i.e. which decision) is relevant for your 
earnings. 
• In that row, your decision fixed the choice for that row, Option A or Option B, and a final random 
number will determine the money payoff for the decision you made. 
• This whole process will be repeated, but the prize amounts may change from one round to the 
next, so look at the prize amounts carefully before you start making decisions. 
• The computer keeps track of your total earnings, i.e. the sum of the amounts earned in each round 
(negative earnings, if any, will be subtracted). Your final earnings will be the sum of all earnings 
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